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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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- VOIR DIRE EXAMINATIONS
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TRIAL

COURT
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State v. Manley (N.J. 1969)
During the voir dire examination at the beginning of a trial resulting
in defendant's murder conviction, his attorney questioned prospective
jurors concerning their ability to confine evidence of defendant's prior
criminal convictions to the issue of credibility.1 After two potential
jurors were interrogated in this manner, the trial judge refused to allow
further questions on that issue unless counsel would indicate an intention
to place defendant on the witness stand, reasoning that if defendant
refused to testify, the fact that he had been previously convicted would
not become evidential 2 and therefore, such a question could only serve
to prejudice the jury against the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial judge did
not abuse the discretion vested in him by the existing practice rulea and
statute,4 and that henceforth, the courts would assume primary re1. The following question is typical:
If during the course of this trial there appears in evidence or it becomes evident
to you that this defendant has once before been convicted of a crime, in fact,
atrocious assault and battery, and that this element is admitted under the Judge's
instructions for the purpose - for a limited purpose, would you be able to follow
the Judge's instructions and use it only for that limited purpose?
State v. Manley, ___ N.J.
___,255 A.2d 193, 196 (1969).
2. State v. Manley,
N.J.
, .
255 A.2d 193, 197 (1969), citing People
v. Sanchez, 35 Cal. 2d 522, 529, 219 P.2d 9, 13 (1950). Cf. State v. Buffa, 31 N.J. 378,
157 A.2d 694, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 916 (1960).
3. N.J. Rgv. RULE 4:48-1 (1968), provides:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination
of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper.
4. N.J. Rv. SrAT. § 2A:78-4 (1951), provides:
Upon the trial of any cause, civil or criminal, all parties may, within the discretion of the court, question any person summoned as a juror, after his name is
drawn from the box and before he is sworn as a juror, and without the interposition of any challenge, to elicit information for the purpose of determining
whether or not to interpose a peremptory challenge and of disclosing whether or
not there is a cause for challenge. In all cases in which a death penalty may be
imposed, the examination as to competency shall be under oath, but in all other
cases it shall be made without putting the juror under oath. Such questions shall
be permitted for the purpose of disclosing whether or not the juror is qualified,
impartial and without interest in the result of the action. The questioning shall
be conducted under the supervision and control of the trial judge and in open court.

(214)
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sponsibility for the interrogation of prospective jurors. 5 State v. Manley,
N.J.
255 A. 2d 193 (1969).
The original purpose of the voir dire examination was to elicit
from the prospective jurors responses which would either show sufficient
freedom from bias for impartial consideration of the case or to indicate
such actual bias as would permit a challenge for cause. 6 In England,
voir dire examinations are perfunctory and conducted only to substantiate
previously interposed challenges. 7 The traditional reason for this procedure was that the potential jurors were generally known in the precinct
where the court was sitting and therefore a counsel could easily discover
whether or not a cause for challenge existed through inquiries outside
the courtroom. 8 In certain cases, where counsel has doubts as to the
venireman's desirability as a juror but no statutory basis for challenge
exists, he is also permitted to challenge the potential juror peremptorily.9
Under the English law, however, examination as a means of determining
the propriety of such a challenge is virtually unknown. 10
The English procedure was initially followed in America, where
the voir dire examination was regarded as incident" to the constitutional
right to trial by an impartial jury.' 2 However, due to territorial ex5. The court utilized the opportunity provided by this case to announce the
adoption of a new New Jersey Court Rule, N.J. Rgv. RULE 1:8-3(a) (1969), effective
September 8, 1969, and applicable in both civil and criminal cases. It provides:

For the purpose of determining whether a challenge should be interposed, the
court shall interrogate the prospective jurors in the box after the required number
are drawn without placing them under oath. The parties or their attorneys may
supplement the court's interrogation in its discretion. At trials of crimes punishable by death where the death penalty has not been waived pursuant to R. 3:1-3,
however, the examination shall be made of each juror individually, as his name
is drawn, and under oath.
6. Comment, Voir Dire Examination - Court or Counsel, 11 ST. Louis L.J.
234 (1967).
7. 31 YALE L.J. 514, 515 (1922).
8. See Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. The English Practice, 16
GEo. L.J. 438 (1928).
9. These challenges are limited by statute according to the nature of the case
and the gravity of the offense. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 78-7 (1951).
10. Moore, supra note 8, at 445.
11. Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 7, 16 (1965). See State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220, 222-23
(Sup. Ct. 1824) ; Clifford v. State, 61 N.J.L. 217, 39 A. 721 (E. & A. 1897).
12. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OP THE JURY
SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION Ol
THE JURY SYSTEM, 26 F.R.D. 411, 465 (1961). The right to trial by jury in federal
courts is guaranteed by U.S. CONST. amend. VI (criminal cases) and by U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (civil cases). The latter amendment does not expressly provide that trial
be by an impartial jury. However, this requirement is implied by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, supra at 465. It is also implied as a result of the common
law. Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). See Vance, Voir Dire
Examination of Jurors in Federal Civil Cases, 8 VILL. L. REv. 76, 77 n.3 (1963);
Comment, Voir Dire - Prevention of Prejudicial Questioning, 50 MINN. L. REV.
1088, 1089 n.7 (1966). The sixth amendment guaranty of the right to trial by an
impartial jury is imposed on state courts in certain criminal cases. In Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all criminal cases where the right would
exist in a federal court. The seventh amendment guaranty has not been extended to
civil cases brought in state courts. Oleson v. The Trust Company of Chicago, 245
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pansion, urbanization and other factors,'3 it frequently became impossible
to face the veniremen with prior knowledge of their respective interests
and prejudices. Consequently, American courts adopted a system of
identifying prejudiced jurors by means of an examination by counsel
prior to challenge, under the supervision of the court. 14 This practice
was judicially recognized as a matter of right in Illinois in 189115 and was
adopted by legislative enactment in New Jersey in 1911.16 The permissible scope of the typical American voir dire examination was likewise
extended to include questions that would enable counsel to intelligently
1
utilize peremptory challenges.

7

This opportunity to directly and extensively interrogate jurors is
presently employed to attain numerous objectives unrelated to the seating
of an unbiased jury.18 It has become common practice for counsel to
F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957). Most state constitutions, how-

ever, guarantee this right in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., N.J.

CoNST.

art. I, § 9.
13. See Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors II: The Federal Practice, 17

Gno. L.J. 13, 36 (1928).
14. Comment, supra note 6, at 235; supra note 7, at 515. Under this system, the

amount of latitude afforded counsel by courts in questioning jurors varies somewhat

from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania voir dire
examinations are conducted in the jury room, out of the presence of the judge. He is
afforded the opportunity to limit questioning only when a specific question is objected

to by counsel. JUDICIAL CONFIRMNCS COMMITTU, supra note 12, at 467. In some
jurisdictions courts are supposed to limit questions to those that are "reasonable and
pertinent." 58 YALg L.J. 638, 640 n.10 (1949). In most jurisdictions, however, a
wide latitude is afforded counsel in conducting the voir dire examination. Id. For
cases admonishing trial court judges to afford considerable leeway to counsel during
the voir dire examination, see e.g., Fredrick v. United States, 163 F.2d 536 (9th
Cir. 1947) ; Henwood v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 P. 373 (1914).
15. Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (1891). The court held that
examinations by counsel prior to challenge was an indispensable incident of the right
of peremptory challenge. This decision was influenced by Stephens v. People, 38 Mich.
739 (1878), where it was held that counsel for the defendant in a criminal case had a
right to personally re-examine jurors after the judge had finished his examination.
16. Law of 1911, ch. 151, [1911] N.J. Laws 220 (repealed 1951). This act provided in pertinent part:
1. From and after the passage of this act all challenges to jurors for any
cause, whatever, in any action or suit, civil or criminal in any court of this state,
may be made at any time before the juror is actually sworn.
2. Upon the trial of any issue in any civil suit or action in any court of this
state each party shall be able to challenge peremptorily six of the general panel
of jurors summoned and returned by the sheriff of [sic] other officer.
3. Either party or his attorney may question any juror after his name is
drawn from the box and before such juror is sworn, for the purpose of eliciting
information upon which he may determine whether or not to interpose such
peremptory challenge. Within the discretion and under the control of the court,
such questions shall be permitted for the purpose of disclosing whether or not the
juror is impartial as between the parties to the suit and without interest therein
or in result thereof.
Section 3 of this statute was held to apply to civil cases alone. Lamble v. State, 96
N.J.L. 231, 234, 114 A. 346, 347 (E. & A. 1921). This limitation of voir dire examination of jurors in noncapital criminal cases was discontinued by N.J. RIv. Ruix
3:7-2(b) (1949), which permitted both the defense and prosecution to examine prospective jurors for the purpose of determining whether to interpose a peremptory
challenge or whether there was cause for challenge. The legislature later modified
the 1911 Act to conform with this rule. N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 2A:78-4 (1951).
17. See, e.g., N.J. Rv. STAT. § 2A:78-4 (1951).
18. Holdaway, Voir Dire - A Neglected Tool of Advocacy, 40 MIL. L. Rzv. 1
(1968) ; Comment, The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11
S. DAK. L. Rlv. 307, 319 (1966). A study made in a midwestern federal district
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seek a favorable rapport with the veniremen through this opportunity
to converse with them.' 9 An advocate may also utilize voir dire to "steal
his opponent's thunder" by previewing some of the evidence he expects
his opponent to introduce. 20 Similarly, he may indoctrinate prospective
21
jurors as to his view of the facts of the case or the law that is applicable.
He may also attempt to elicit responses from the prospective jurors that
require a commitment to vote in a particular manner. 22 These secondary
objectives are most frequently accomplished under the guise of soliciting
charge involving
the jurors' ability or willingness to follow a judicial
23
case.
the
of
theories
legal
or
facts,
evidence,
the
Several authorities seem to elevate these ends to a status coequal
with the primary purpose of the voir dire examination.2 4 However, the
Manley court recognized that these practices were a drain on valuable
court time and a subversion of the original purpose of the voir dire
examination."0 The court's conclusion that such practices frequently
contribute to an inordinately lengthy trial seems valid since the voir
dire examination during Manley's trial extended over eight days and,
as the court pointed out, this was not unusual.2 6 Consequently, it would
appear that this procedure contributes substantially to the judicial
backlog common in American courts, and tends to encourage citizens
27
to shirk jury duty.
court indicates that only 20% of the questions asked in the course of voir dire are
genuinely intended to discover bias. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical
Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rv. 503, 522 (1965). The Manley court intimated that the
judiciary unwittingly fostered these practices by failing effectively to control the
scope of voir dire.

--

N.J. at _

, 255 A.2d at 202.

19. Comment, supra note 6, at 245; Comment, supra note 18 at 335. See also
R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHoDS 244 (1954); Amandes, Prom Voir Dire to
Verdict Through a Juror's Eyes, 9 PRAc. LAw. 21, 23 (1963).
20. Holdaway, supra note 18, at 22.
21. J. APPLEMAN, PREPARATION AND TRIAL 167 (1967).
And I freely confess that I, as well as other professional advocates, do my
damndest to indoctrinate jurors at this and every other stage of the trial. This
is our job.
See I M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 796-99 (1954); Wormwood, Selection of a Jury in
a Civil Case, 33 DICTA 179, 183 (1956).
22. Brill, Voir Dire I - Examination of Jurors, 29 Mo. L. RZv. 259, 263 (1964);
Comment, supra note 12, at 1092, 1095.

23. Examples of such questions include:
Can you follow an instruction that requires you to disregard evidence of
defendant's prior convictions in determining his guilt or innocence?
Do you agree with the rule of law that requires acquittal in the event there
is reasonable doubt?

Could defendant rely upon you to vote for acquittal if the evidence were
evenly balanced?

Would you convict defendant if the prosecution showed certain facts and if
the court charged that these facts violate the law?
For an exhaustive study of the propriety and effects of asking jurors hypothetical
questions, see 99 A.L.R.2d 7 (1965).
24. See Holdaway, supra note 18, at 2; Comment, supra note 18, at 318-19.
25.
N.J. at ---- -255 A.2d at 205.
26. Id. at .. 255 A.2d at 195.

27. SECTION O1 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION Olt THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE JUDGE-JuRY RELATIONSHIP IN THE STATE COURTS, 23 OnE. L. REV. 3, 6 (1943) ;
Amandes, supra note 19, at 23; Dodd, Note on Judicial Organization and Procedure,
24 AM. POL. ScI. Rzv. 117, 127 (1930) ; Comment, supra note 6, at 242.
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A more serious consequence of these ostensible efforts to "discover
bias" is the tendency of the questions to implant in the mind of the
prospective juror either a prejudice favoring the questioner or disfavoring his adversary. The attempts of opposing counsel to achieve rapport
with the jurors while interrogating them can have but two results. If
both are equally successful, the efforts of both are frustrated; on the
other hand, if one attorney better succeeds in achieving this rapport,
28
the other is put at a disadvantage simply because he is not as engaging.
This latter result is obviously in direct contravention of the intended
purpose of voir dire.
Deleterious repercussions also inhere in the practice of previewing
evidence. By so doing counsel may intentionally or unwittingly reveal
evidence that would be inadmissible in the ensuing trial. The situation,
as presented by the trial court, in the instant case provides a good
illustration of the harm that could result from this practice. 29 Although
the fact of Manley's prior conviction was revealed in good faith, it could
not be admitted if Manley failed to testify and its disclosure during the
course of voir dire could only prejudice him.
Voir dire examinations also afford an opportunity to bring other
inadmissible and prejudicial facts and legal interpretations to the attention
of the jury. For example, in jurisdictions where allusion to liability
insurance coverage is otherwise inadmissible,80 the voir dire examination
may provide a vehicle for injecting this fact to the defendant's detriment."' In addition, counsel may take this opportunity to distort operative
facts of the case, narrating them in a manner that will benefit his
client and prejudice the opposition. A similar abuse may also inhere
in the practice of educating the jurors in the applicable rule of law.
Since attorneys frequently slant legal principles in the manner most
favorable to their cause, this practice is not only prejudicial, but can
also result in confusing the potential jurors and requiring the court to
rule prematurely on questions of law. 82
28. Comment, supra note 6, at 245.

29. ____ N.J. at .___255 A.2d at 196.
30. This is the general rule in the United States. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 764, 767
(1949) ; 28 Miss. L.J. 65 (1956).
31. Comment, supra note 18, at 332-33; Comment, supra note 12, at 1093. Such

questions commonly take this form: "Have you any interest as a director, shareholder,
or employee of a company insuring for damages resulting from the operation of a
motor vehicle?" For a detailed discussion of voir dire problems relating to insurance,
see Vetter, Voir Dire II - Liability Insurance, 29 Mo. L. Rv. 305 (1964).
32. The dangers inherent in the practice of educating potential jurors in the rules
of supposedly pertinent law are succinctly enumerated in the instant case:
That the supposed instructions as orally expounded by the advocate are slanted,
argumentative, and so often clearly erroneous as to cause certain reversal if given
by the court, surprisingly appears to be a matter of little concern .... When an
attorney is allowed to give his version of the law to the jury, the other lawyer
is certain to retaliate by giving his version of it. The inevitable result is that
the court is required in settling the dispute to instruct the jury orally and in
advance on questions of law that may not eventually be relevant to the inquiry.
N.J.

,

255 A.2d 193, 204 (1969), citing, [ILL.] CowMrrmE

ON LIMITA-

TION Ol VOIR Di* EXAMINATIONS, REPORT TO THZ JUDICIAL CONFZRENCE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON LIMITATION or Voni Dniz EXAMINATIONS (1958).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 11
FALL

1969]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The avowed purpose of the rule promulgated in Manley is to bring
about ". . . an expedient selection of a fair and impartial jury"' 8 and
to eliminate the opportunity to undermine this purpose by the practices
previously noted. This objective is to be attained by transferring the
primary responsibility for conducting the voir dire examination from
counsel to the trial judge, and by stringently limiting its permissible
scope. The technique adopted by the Manley court for curtailing abuses
of the voir dire examination is by no means unique. Acting upon the
34
recommendation of the judicial conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
Congress in 1938 incorporated within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure85 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 provisions which
grant trial court judges the option of either permitting counsel to conduct
the examination or conducting it themselves. In the latter event counsel
is permitted to supplement the questioning either directly or through the
court. A 1961 survey indicates that 51 federal district courts have
adopted procedures whereby the judge takes the predominant role in conducting examinations.8 7 Similarly, a number of states have either enacted
legislation or promulgated court rules granting judges similar powers. 38
It has been the experience of the federal court system that voir
dire examinations conducted by judges and supplemented by counsel
result in a great saving of time and improvement in the character of
the examinations.89 Such a system provides the advantages of eliminating
unnecessary or repetitious questioning and premature rulings on questions of law. Preliminary questioning by the court is also more likely
to produce a truly impartial jury since questions advanced by the judge
33. ___ N.J. at ___ 255 A.2d at 205.
34. Examination of the prospective jurors shall be by the judge alone. If counsel
on either side desire that additional matter be inquired into, he shall state the
matter to the judge, and the judge, if the matter is proper, shall conduct the
examination.

Recommendations of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 10 A.B.A.J.

875 (1924).
35. FZD. R. Civ. P. 47(a), states:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination
of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event,
the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination
by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective
jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
36. FED. R.

CRIM.

P. 24(a), states:

The court may permit the defendant or his attorney or the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct
the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his
attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by
such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective
jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
37. JUDICIAL CONFICRNCX COMMITTEg ON TH OPRATION olt THP JuRY SYSTgM,
supra note 12, at 466.
38. See Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications, and
Selection, 36 B.U.L. Riv. 1, 73 (1956). For a detailed survey of state practices, see
Comment, supra note 6, at 237 n.25.
39.

JUDICIAL CONMERENCE COMMITrv9 ON THS OPERATION OP THIC JURY SYSTPM,

supra note 12, at 467. A study made in Illinois, where a similar system is in effect,
indicates that judge-conducted examinations reduce the time necessary for impaneling
a jury from at least a half day to two hours. Crebs Voir Dire Examinations of

Jurors; An Appraisal by a Judge, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 644, 646 (1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/11
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appear to be more objective and less inclined to distort the relevant
law or facts in a manner beneficial to either party.
Some commentators have expressed the fear that court-conducted
examinations will undermine the basic purpose of the voir dire examination because trial judges cannot have sufficient knowledge of the facts
and issues involved in a given case to conduct an examination of adequate specificity. 40 However, the regulations providing for court-conducted examination, including the rule promulgated in the instant case,
seem to answer this objection by permitting counsel to submit supplemental questions to the jurors.4 1 Such questions could fill the gap in
those situations where the court has an insufficient grasp of the factual
or legal situation.
The position has also been advanced that court-conducted voir dire
examinations would render the right of peremptory challenge meaningless, 42 since such challenges are frequently contingent on a juror's im-

mediate reaction to a question - i.e., a facial expression, halting answer,
or a sense of resistance.43 It is widely recognized, however, that the peremptory challenge constitutes a matter of right only when its purpose is
the elimination of veniremen who are suspected of possessing a bias, prejudice, or other ground for disqualification that has not been articulated in
a manner that would sustain a challenge for cause. It was not intended as
a vehicle for providing counsel with the opportunity to select as favorable
a jury as possible.44 Therefore, it would seem that criticism of court40. See Carr, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors; An Appraisal by an Attorney,
1963 U. ILL. L.F. 653, 659 (1963) ; Heyl, Selection of the Jury, 40 ILL. B.J. 328, 331

(1952) ; Comment, supra note 18, at 317.
41. Such questions, of course, could not exceed the limitations announced by these
rules and would be asked under the supervision of the trial judge. In some instances
a court's refusal to permit proper questions, not otherwise covered, can constitute
reversible error. See, e.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1936) (Negro
about to be tried for murder entitled to ask jurors whether they were racially
prejudiced); Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (refusal to
permit inquiry whether testimony of police officer would be given undue weight
deemed reversible error). For a discussion of the propriety of judicial refusal to
permit certain questions, see 17 MINN. L. Rlv. 299 (1952).
42. See OREGON BAR AssoClON, REPORT Olt JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1925), cited in
4 ORE. L. Rxv. 263, 270 (1925).
43. L. NIZER, My Lin IN Couwr 35-36 (1961). Investigation anterior to the
trial is also employed as a basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges. In less
populous areas an investigation may be made by counsel, himself. J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 21, at 160. In some jurisdictions "jury services" are available to supply counsel
with data concerning the venire. M. BELLI, supra note 21, at 785-88. For a detailed
discussion of juror investigation techniques and the propriety of such practices, see
Okun, Investigation of Jurors By Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56
Ggo. L.J. 839 (1968). It is arguable that in situations where one litigant is in a
superior economic position or has ready access to personal data, e.g., a governmental
agency, a rule limiting the scope of voir dire will put the other party at a serious
disadvantage as it would be unable to compensate for its disparate position by an
extensive in-trial interrogation.
44. See Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 477 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967), vacated
on other grounds, 392 U.S. 647 (1968) ; Commonwealth v, McGrew, 375 Pa. 518,
100 A.2d 467 (1953) ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470, 499 (1903) ; supra
note 14, at 638. The position is advanced, however, that a recognized and legitimate
function of the peremptory challenge is to afford counsel the opportunity to eliminate
"juror types" who, because of their religious, occupational, social or ethnic backgrounds,
are not generally as well disposed toward the type of client he represents or the case
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conducted examinations, on the ground that they may impede the selection
of favorable jurors are illegitimate, as such an objective exceeds the scope
of the right granted. However, assuming that visceral reactions are reliable
indicators of unarticulated partiality, 45 it seems that they could be evoked
with equal effectiveness through appropriate questions asked by the court
or through supplemental questions advanced by counsel.
It has also been argued that the potential jurors are so awed by a
judge-conducted interrogation that they hesitate to respond franklyY4
This problem is particularly significant in jurisdictions where it is customary for the court to question the venire as a group. Not only are the
questions perfunctory, 47 but this system provides the potential juror with
a sense of immunity from the attention of the court. The average venireman is reluctant to leave the anonymity afforded by the venire, admit a
bias or prejudice, and thereby necessarily focus upon himself the judge's
undivided attention.4 8 As a result, questions, which if asked individually
might elicit frank admissions of prejudice, frequently draw absolutely no
response. However, the judge-conducted examination does protect the
juror from a potentially humiliating partisan examination and such an
assurance should encourage him to respond to questions frankly and
honestly, without fear of a supplemental "grilling" by counsel. But even
if court-conducted examinations were found to inhibit frank disclosure,
the advantages inherent in this system would appear to offset the inhibitive
effects. It has been observed that:
There is another merit in judicial examination - it brings the judge
into a position of greater prominence in the conduct of jury trials.
The part of the court is emphasized at the very commencement of
the trial and the consciousness of the judge's importance in the minds
of the jury and the public may be expected to continue throughout
the case. Moreover, it will have a stimulating effect upon trial courts,
for they will be taking
more active part in the attempt to secure
49
justice in jury cases.

The criticism
ally when the
nature of the
veniremen to

of group questioning, on the other hand, seems valid, especiultimate purpose of voir dire is considered. The perfunctory
questions submitted as well as the reluctance of individual
respond to them leave counsel with little if any basis for

he advocates as other "juror types" would be. To this end, it is argued, counsel
should be permitted the opportunity, during the course of voir dire, to question the
veniremen as to their general backgrounds. Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284,
297, 234 A.2d 552, 560 (1967) (raising and rejecting this contention). For discussions
on favorable and unfavorable "juror types" see J. APPLUMAN, supra note 21, at 162-65;
M. BLLI, supra note 21, at 814-31; Comment, supra note 18, at 341-62.
45. But see Broeder, supra note 18, at 505-06.
46. 1959 Institute for California Judges - Panel Discussion, Part II: Selecting
the Jury, 47 CAL. L. Rv. 872, 873 (1959) (remarks by Joseph Ball) ; Comment, supra
note 6, at 240-41.
47. E.g., Has any juror any bias or prejudice as to the type of case or to any
party? Carr, supra note 40, at 659.
48. Comment, supra note 18, at 318.
49. Comment, supra note 6, at 244-45, citing Atkinson, The Voir Dire Examination of Jurors in Kansas, 1 J.B.A. KAN. 125, 138 (1932).
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elimination of biased or prejudiced veniremen. This emasculation of the
challenging procedure can be prevented by simply forbidding the practice
of group questioning. The Manley rule utilizes this approach in capital
cases where the death penalty has not been waived.50 It is submitted,
however, that the purpose of this rule would better be served if the court
had extended the prohibition of group questioning to all cases, both criminal and civil. Insistence on individual questioning would assure counsel
of a basis for intelligent utilization of his challenges. It would also preclude the necessity of continual submission of supplemental questions to
attain this end, a practice which could reinstate many of the abuses this
rule was designed to eliminate.
While it would appear that the rule espoused in Manley returns voir
dire to its proper perspective, it should be noted that there is some skepticism as to whether court-conducted examinations will achieve the hoped
for results. 51 This pessimism is supported by a study conducted in Illinois
52
where trial judges are primarily responsible for conducting voir dire.
The study indicates that many of the judges adhered to the letter but not
the spirit of the rule, asking a few perfunctory questions at the outset
of the examination and then surrendering the floor to counsel.53 The
Manley court, envisioning such possibilities, accompanied its mandate with
unequivocal instructions concerning its implementation. It indicated that
voir dire examinations should be conducted substantially, if not exclusively,
by the trial judges, and that counsel should submit any additional questions
to the court prior to commencement of the trial. It admonished trial
judges that such questions when asked by counsel should be closely regulated, and that henceforth, the scope of judicial discretion in permitting
questions would be greatly limited. The purpose of the new rule, the court
5 4
felt, should amply define the permissible boundaries of such questioning.
However, in order to reduce the possibility of equivocation and to compensate for the lack of precedent, the court appended a lengthy catalog
of questions which have been declared improper in other jurisdictions. 55
It indicated that such questions were illustrative of those the new regulation would prohibit.
In the final analysis, the trial judges of New Jersey will determine
the success or failure of this new procedure in curtailing the abuses which
50. See N.J. Rgv. RULS 1:8-3(a) (1969).

51. See Carr, supra note 40.
52. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.24-1 (1967).
53. Carr, supra note 40, at 654.
54 - ----N.J. at ........ 255 A.2d at 206.
55. Id. The questions enumerated therein were all asked in conjunction with
criminal cases. They fall into the following categories: those requiring a juror to
commit himself to vote a certain way in a given situation; those asking whether a
juror would be unduly swayed by the opinions of his peers; those requiring a juror
to speculate what he, himself, would do in the event of a certain contingency; those
which asked whether a juror would follow a certain rule of law after counsel had
stated the substance thereof; those which preview facts or evidence; those which
require a juror to judge his own mental attitudes; and those which ask whether a
juror would give more credence to one witness than to another. For additional
examples of improper questions, see Note, supra note 41.
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have blighted voir dire examinations. If their conduct is guided by the
purpose of the rule and the instructions which accompanied it, the voir
dire examination should, once again, constitute a means of detecting prejudice rather than an instrument for inculcating it.
John F. DePue

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT EQUAL REPRESENTATION REQUIREMENT REQUIRES A GOOD FAITH
EFFORT TO ACHIEVE ABSOLUTE EQUALITY.

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (U.S. 1969)
Wells v. Rockefeller (U.S. 1969)
In 1965, voters and citizens of the state of Missouri initiated suit
in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri seeking to
have Missouri's 1961 Congressional Apportionment Statute declared
unconstitutional.' In 1967, a similar suit was instituted in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, by voters and citizens
thereof, to have New York's 1961 congressional districting statute also
declared unconstitutional. 2 Both suits were successful in obtaining the
declaration of unconstitutionality, and further legislation and court
action ensued. 8
In the proceedings immediately below, the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri held that Missouri's latest congressional
districting statute 4 did not meet the constitutional requirement of equal
representation because of obviously avoidable variances of population
1. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 238 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Mo. 1965).

2. Wells v. Rockefeller, 273 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. After the decision in 1965 in which the Missouri statute was declared unconstitutional, the General Assembly enacted new reapportionment legislation which was
likewise declared unconstitutional. In this declaration, the District Court retained
jurisdiction to review any further redistricting plan. Preisler v. Secretary of State of
Missouri, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
385 U.S. 450 (1967). In 1967, the present statute, Mo. Rgv. STAT. ch. 128 (Cum.
Supp. 1967), was enacted, and the Attorney General of Missouri moved for a declaration sustaining the Act, and dismissing suit in the District Court.
In 1967, the District Court in Wells advised "changes which can be superimposed on the present districts to cure the most flagrant inequalities" in time for
the 1968 elections and retained jurisdiction pending reapportionment. 273 F. Supp.
at 992. Within a month and a half after the legislature reconvened, the present districting statute was enacted, and the District Court again reviewed the legislation.
4. The 1967 Missouri redistricting statute, Mo. Rlv. STAT. ch. 128 (Cum. Supp.
1967), divides the state into ten congressional districts. Based on the 1960 census of
Missouri total population of 4,319,813, the ideal population per district is 431,981. The
1967 statute created districts of population ranging from 3.13% (13,542) above the
ideal, to 2.84% (12,260) below it. The average variation from the ideal was 1.6%,
and the population difference between the largest and smallest districts is 25,802.
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between districts without acceptable justification therefor. 5 The validity
of New York's statute 6 however was sustained by the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, which held that the plan afforded
New York voters "an opportunity to vote in the 1968 and 1970 elections
'7
on a basis of population equality within reasonably comparable districts."
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court
of Missouri, and reversed that of New York's holding that "the command
of Art. I, Sec. 2, that States create congressional districts which provide
equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited
population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort
to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969), Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969).
In the landmark decision of Baker v. Carr,8 the Supreme Court
held that the voters' challenge to an apportionment statute presented a
justiciable constitutional cause of action, within reach of judicial protection, and was not a non-justiciable political question.9 Though the
Supreme Court did not indicate any standard to determine whether
relief or remedy was to be accorded on remand, 10 Baker made clear
5. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
6. New York's 1968 congressional districting statute, N.Y. StAT LAW §§ 110-12
(McKinney 1968), divides the state into 41 congressional districts. The ideal population per district is 409,324. The 1968 statute creates a variance in district population
of from 6.488% (25,556) above the ideal to 6.608% (27,052) below. The difference
between the largest and smallest district is 53,653 persons.
New York's population statistics clearly demonstrate that 31 of New York's
districts were divided into seven regions. These regions were then subdivided into
districts of virtually identical population to other districts within the region. The
districts of different substates were markedly unequal however. New York's remaining
10 districts were composed of whole county groupings.
7. Wells v. Rockefeller, 281 F. Supp. 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. The District Court had held that the case presented a non-justiciable political
question. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959). The court relied on
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946), an Illinois congressional districting
case, wherein Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, but joined only by
Justices Reed and Burton, cautioned that "[c]ourts ought not enter this political
thicket . . . [and that] . . . [v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form
of government cannot be challenged in the Courts [citing authority]."
For a detailed analysis of Frankfurter's opinion see Beiser, The Misread
Milestone: Colegrove v. Green, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 336 (1967). See also Rankin, The
High Price Extracted For Not Entering The Political Thicket, 15 Am. U.L. Rev. 1
(1965) ; Tollet, Political Questions And The Law, 42 U. Drt. L.J. 439 (1965).
After full consideration of Colegrove, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Baker
that: (1) the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) the Tennessee
voters had standing to sue; and (3) the plaintiffs had stated a justiciable cause of
action on which relief could be granted.
The Court stated that the District Court had misinterpreted Colegrove.
Mr. Justice Clark's concurring opinion, in Baker, refers to Colegrove as ". . . one
[case] not only in which the Court was bobtailed but in which there was no majority
opinion. Indeed even the 'political question' point in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
was no more than alternative ground." 369 U.S. at 251.
See Note, Challenges to Congressional Districting: After Baker v. Carr
Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 COLUTm. L. Rv. 98 (1963). See generally
A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 YALU L.J. 7 (1962).
10. The question of a judicial standard on which to decide the merits and grant
appropriate relief was not discussed by the majority. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a
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225

that an important new role of the federal courts would be as overseers
of all congressional districting statutes."
In Wesberry v. Sanders,'2 two voters sought a judgment declaring
Georgia's districting statute invalid. The District Court, while paying
lip service to Baker, dismissed the case for "want of equity," which
was simply a post-Baker term for non-justiciability of a political question.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, finding justiciability through Baker v. Carr,
and holding that Georgia's unequal apportionment of congressional districts grossly discriminated against voters of certain districts in violation
of Art. I, Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution. 14 For the first time
the Supreme Court, with extensive historical examination of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, held that the constitutional mandate of
Article I, Section 2 - that United States Representatives be chosen
"by the people of the several states" - meant that "as nearly as is
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another's."' 15 The Court concluded "[wlhile it may not be
concurring opinion, stated only that, "any relief accorded can be fashioned in the light

of well-known principles of equity." 369 U.S. at 250. Mr. Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion, complained that the Court had failed ". . . to give the District Court
any guidance whatever." 369 U.S. at 252. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined in dissent
by Mr. Justice Harlan, laments that "[elven assuming the indispensable intellectual
disinterestedness on the part of judges in such matters, they do not have accepted
legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial
judgments." 369 U.S. at 268. This issue of standards, which is central to the Preisler
decision, received much comment after Baker. See generally Dean, One Man-One
Vote - Problems of Judicial Enforcement of Standards of Political Conduct, 36
OKLA. B.A.J. 1436 (1965) ; Hanson, Courts in the Thicket: The Problem of Judicial
Standard in Apportionment Cases, 12 AM. U.L. Rv.51 (1963) ; Israel, On Charting
A Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61
MICH. L. Rtv. 107 (1962). See also 16 S.C.L. Rzv. 634 (1964); 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv.
1345 (1966) ; 114 U. PA. L. Rtv. 504 (1966) ; 72 YALz L.J. 968 (1963).
11. Litigation challenging the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment
schemes had been instituted in at least 34 states prior to the end of 1962 - within
nine months of the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr. See McKay, Political Thickets
and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MIcH. L. Rnv. 645,
706-10 (1963), which contains an appendix summarizing reapportionment litigation
through the end of 1962. See also Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment,
72 YALE L.J. 90 (1962).
12. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
13. Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962). While the district
court said their dismissal was based on "want of equity," they cited, as their basis,
Justice Frankfurter's "political question" opinion in Colegrove. The Wesberry court
found that the following factors, present inColegrove, required dismissal for "want
of equity":
[A] political question involving a coordinate branch of the federal government; a political question posing a delicate problem difficult of solution without
depriving others of the right to vote by district, unless we are to redistrict the
state; relief may be forthcoming from a properly apportioned state legislature;
and relief may be afforded by the Congress.
Id. at 285.
14. In doing so the Court said, "[w]e do not reach the arguments that the Georgia
statute violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 n.10 (1964).
15. 376 U.S. at 7-8. This interpretation of the mandate of article I, section 2,
was not agreed to by Justices Harlan, Stewart and Clark. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his
dissenting opinion, criticizes the "artificial construction" of article I:
[s]tripped of rhetoric and a "historical context" . . . which bears little resemblance to the evidence found in the pages of history, . . . the Court's opinion
supports its holding only with the bland assertion that "the principles of a House
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possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that
is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain objective of making
equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal
for the House of Representatives."'
The impact of Wesberry was widespread. Since the decision in
1964, thirty-seven states have undergone congressional redistricting.
Of the remaining thirteen, five have a single representative each, and two
elect representatives at large. 7
In the state legislative apportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims,""
the Supreme Court declared Alabama's state legislative districting statute
invalid and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to population
inequality without rational justification therefor. While Reynolds, being
concerned with state legislative districting, 19 is factually distinguishable
from Wesberry and the instant case, its importance in both areas of state
and congressional districting is in its discussion of justifications for
population variance. While the Court concedes that rational state policy
may provide justification for some deviation from equality of state
legislative districts, it dismisses many more considerations than it
accepts. 20 Reynolds' effect was to confine the limits of the "as nearly
as is practicable" standard of Wesberry, putting state legislatures on
notice that thereafter many traditional districting considerations, such
as history, geography, and group interests were no longer sufficient to
justify unequal districts as being "as nearly [equal] as is practicable." 21
of Representatives elected, by the People" would be "cast aside" if "a vote is
worth more in one district than in another" . . . The fact is however, that
Georgia's 10 Representatives are elected "by the People" of deorgia, just as
Representatives from other states are elected "by the People of the several States."
This is all that the Constitution requires.
Id. at 24. Justices Stewart and Clark, expressly agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan on
this issue. See also Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders: A Case of Oversimplification,
9 VILL. L. Rzv. 415 (1964); Weiss, An Analysis of Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 So.
CAL. L. Rev. 67 (1965) ; 32 Gao. WASH. L. Rzv. 1076 (1965).
16. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
17. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MicH. L.
Riv. 223, 229 (1968).
18. 377 U.S. 533, rehearing denied 379 U.S. 870 (1964). See King, The Reynold's
Standard And Local Reapportionment, 15 BuVFALO L. Rzv. 120 (1965) ; 3 Am. Bus.
L.J. 91 (1965); 31 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 149 (1964); 43 TXXAS L. Rzv. 236 (1964);
39 TUL. L. Rev. 349 (1965).
19. The Court distinguished between state and congressional apportionment when
it observed that "[s]omewhat more flexibility may therefore be constitutionally per-

missible with respect to state legislative apportionment than in congressional districting." 377 U.S. at 578. With this distinction it seems clear that whatever is impermissible in state legislative districting, would have to be impermissble in the less
flexible congressional districting. In Justice White's dissenting opinion in Preisler,
however, he criticizes the Court for making no attempt to distinguish state apportionment from congressional districting questions.
20. Fhe Court stated:
[b]ut neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are
permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities . . . . Considerations of
area alone provide an insufficient justification . . . . Arguments . . . to insure
effective representation for sparsely settled areas and to prevent . . . access of
citizens to their representatives [from being] impaired are . . . unconvincing.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 579-80.
21. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, compiled the following list of
considerations which he contended the Court had ruled constitutionally impermissible
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The only apparent consideration in Reynolds which would justify deviation was the maintenance of political subdivisions for the express purpose
22
of deterring political gerrymandering.
Still, the question remained, in state legislatures and federal courts,
as to what constituted the standard of "as nearly as is practicable?"
In Preisler, the Court addresses itself to elucidating the "as nearly as
23
practicable" standard.
Mr. Justice Brennan writing for the majority in Preisler begins by
rejecting Missouri's initial argument in support of its congressional districting statute. Missouri first argued that the population variances were
so slight as to be de miniMis24 and therefore satisfy without question

the "as nearly as is practicable" requirement. The Court rejected a
de minimis approach because of difficulty in non-arbitrarily determining
a cutoff point below which variations are de minimis, 25 and because
such a point would encourage legislatures to strive for a range, rather
than for absolute equality.
The Court pronounced that the
"as nearly as practicable" standard requires that the State make a
good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality ...
Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown
to have resulted despite such 26effort, the State must justify each
variance, no matter how small.
in one or another of its decisions: history; economic or other sorts of groups interests;
area; geographical considerations; a desire to insure effective representation for
sparsely settled areas; availability of access of citizens to their representatives;
theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the Court) ; occupation; an
attempt to balance urban and rural power; the preference of a majority of voters in
the State. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 622-23.
22. This is the analysis of Dean Robert McKay, counsel for the appellant in
Wells: "[alpparently, the only acceptable justification for population variances is the
use of political subdivision lines . . . [to] . . . prevent an otherwise destructive gerrymander. . . ." McKay, supra note 17, at 233.
23. 394 U.S. at 528.
24. The phrase de minmis is found in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (4th ed.
1951), as part of the phrase de minimis non curat lex which is defined as "[tihe
law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters." The phrase
was first used in a reapportionment case by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in
Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 335 (1962), where he uses the term to imply an
"insignificant discrepancy" in the original plan of 1901 where each county was only
under-represented - or over-represented by one representative at most. In a lower
federal court decision, Calkins v. Hare, 228 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 1964), the
phrase was used to illustrate Wesberry's "mathematical precision caveat." See p.
225 supra. That court noted that the de minimis phrase could not be used as an
escape hatch for the reluctant. In Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967), Mr.
Justice White similarly uses the phrase to describe mathematically unavoidable deviations in his statement that "mathematical exactness or precision is not required . . .
de minimis deviations are unavoidable."
25. The Court emphasized that practicable equality may differ from state to state,
and district to district, thus militating against an absolute cutoff point. Also in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964), and Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
445 (1967), the Court stated "[w]hat is marginally permissible in one State may be
unsatisfactory in another depending on the particular circumstances of the case."
26. 394 U.S. at 530-31. In Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 447 (1967), Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, criticized the rule placing the burden of justification of
variation on the state, as "standing on its head" the usual rule that state legislative
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Having required justification for any variance unless a good faith
effort toward absolute equality is shown, the Court must first determine
whether there was such a good faith effort. In making this determination
the Supreme Court reviewed the following findings of the district court:
(1) the Missouri General Assembly had relied on population data
less accurate than the available census figures; and
(2) the General Assembly had rejected a proposed plan with
smaller population variances; and
(3) the simple transfer of entire counties into a27contiguous district
would have markedly reduced the variances.
The inevitable conclusion which was drawn was that Missouri had
not made a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality. The Court
further stated that it was simply inconceivable that such variances
were unavoidable.
Missouri had also argued, in the alternative, that the population
variances between districts had legally valid justifications. Emphasizing
that practical politics does not determine practicable equality, the Court
examined, and rejected, each of the following five justifications proposed
by Missouri: (1) the representation of distinct interest groups ;28 (2) the
political realities of legislative interplay ;29 (3) the integrity of county lines
and maintenance of political subdivisions ;3o (4) considerations of population
32
trends;31 and (5) the high proportions of non-voters in certain districts.
In essence the Court rejected the first three of these considerations
as simply invalid justifications for population variances. In so doing
enactments come to the Supreme Court with a strong presumption of regularity and
constitutionality. But see Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969).
27. 394 U.S. at 529.

28. The Court relied on Reynolds in rejecting this consideration. 394 U.S. at 533.
See note 20 supra.
29. The Court reasoned that "[problems created by partisan politics cannot justify
an apportionment which does not otherwise pass the constitutional muster." Id.
30. While Reynolds accepted the justification of some variance due to the drawing
of district lines along political boundaries in order to deter gerrymandering, the Court
now rejects this justification as a variant of the previously disposed of argument that
practical politics justify some deviation. Id.
31. The Court said that "[wihere these shifts [population trends] can be predicted
with a high degree of accuracy, States that are redistricting may properly consider
them." Id. at 535. However, the Court found that Missouri did not, in fact, consider
this factor prior to apportionment. The Court relied on the district court which found
"no evidence . . . that the . . . General Assembly adopted any policy of population
projection in devising Districts 4 and 6, or any other district, in enacting the 1967
Act." 279 F. Supp. 952, 983 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
32. Missouri contended that overpopulation in the Eighth District was due to a
large number of non-voters in a university and military base therein. As in the consideration of population trends, the Court found that Missouri had not actually considered this factor before enacting the apportionment statute. The Court assumed,
arguendo, that valid apportionment might be based on voter population, rather than
total population, but found that:
[T]he Missouri plan is still unacceptable. Missouri made no attempt to ascertain
the number of eligible voters in each district and to apportion accordingly. . ..
[O]verpopulation in the Eighth District was explained away by the presence in
that district of a military base and a university; no attempt was made to account
for the presence of universities in other districts . . .
394 U.S. at 534-35.
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the Court was emphasizing its insistence on the priority of equal popular
representation over political considerations. The Court's handling of the
final two considerations indicates that it has not rejected every possible
justification as suggested by Mr. Justice Fortas in his concurring
. to open no avenue to
opinion,3 3 but that the Court intends "
subterfuge" 34 in allowing some justifications.
It is submitted that the crux of this case lies in that determination
of the Court to close the loopholes in its requirement of equal representation. The Court's ruling in Preisler is dictated not so much from concern over mathematical variation, as it is from concern over Missouri's
conspicuous bad faith in its reapportionment effort. Missouri came to
the Court with inaccurate data, avoidable variances, simple solutions, and
feigned justifications. Under these circumstances the Court's rejection of
its districting plan was inevitable.
Similarly in Wells, a cursory review by the Supreme Court established
that the constitutionally required good faith effort to achieve absolute
equality among all of its 41 districts was simply not made. While other
considerations are mentioned in the decision,3 5 it is absolutely clear, as
the Supreme Court found, that the basis of the plan was to divide the
state into seven homogeneous regions, creating equal congressional districts within each region. However, there was no equality between congressional districts of different regions. 36 This was evident in the language of the district court where it sustained New York's statute "on
3 7

a basis of population equality within reasonably comparable districts."

This ruling cannot be upheld by the Court after its pronouncements in
Reynolds and Preisler that population equality may not be subordinated
to the consideration of preserving distinct interest groups. 8
Again the real basis for this decision is not found in a violation of
mathematical precision, or in the excess of a few percentage points, but
rather in the fact that New York did not attempt to accomplish that
which the Court said it must. The very essence of New York's plan was
not in the achievement of state-wide district population equality, but in
the maintenance of regions with distinct interest groups. Where Missouri
did not put forth a good faith effort in its plan, New York used an im33. 394 U.S. at 537.
34. Id. at 535.
35. No testimony as to justification for variances was taken by the District Court
but reference was made to the Joint Legislative Committee's Report which recites
that considerations other than population totals were "geographical conformation of
the area .... the maintenance of county integrity, the facility by which the various
Boards of Elections can 'tool up' for the forthcoming [1968] primary election, equality
of population within the region, and equality of population throughout the state."
394 U.S. at 545.
36. See note 6 supra.
37. 281 F. Supp. 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added).
38. 394 U.S. 546. In reversing the judgment of the New York district court,
the Supreme Court recognized that considerations of time may have validated the use
of the plan in the 1968 elections, but that a plan meeting constitutional requirements
had to be enacted for the 1970 election. Id. at 547.
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permissible plan. In both cases it is this misdirection of purpose which
the Court has tried to correct, not the simple failure to divide evenly.
Nevertheless, the criticism that the Court is drawing too strict a
requirement by insisting on mathematical perfection and rejecting rational
explanations for variation is strongly voiced in the concurring and dissenting opinions of the Court. The main objections of these Justices are
twofold. It is felt that the Court's stringent standard takes the properly
legislative function of districting out of the state legislatures and into the
courts, and that the effect of these decisions, rather than perfecting representation, encourages gerrymandering.
In objecting to the rigorous standard of equality, Mr. Justice White
views the Court's decision as an "unduly rigid and unwarranted application of the Equal Protection Clause," 8 9 even though the Court made absolutely clear that its decision was based on the constitutional requirement
of Article I, Section 2.40 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined in dissent by Mr.
Justice Stewart, more accurately voices his criticism by restating his
objection in Wesberry - that the command of Article I, Section 2, is
non-existent. 41 Thus, he logically contends that the Court is compounding
its error here by insistence on mathematical perfection in following that
"command." In a similar complaint, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring
opinion, erroneously complains that the majority's standard requires not
only a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality, but also
justification of any remaining disparities. 42 He then finds that the Court
4
has rejected possibly every type of justification that could be advanced.
In envisioning the result of such a stringent standard, both Mr.
Justice White and Mr. Justice Fortas foresee the courts laboriously
44
drawing district lines through apartment houses, and private dwellings.
As a solution, Mr. Justice White advocates a de minimis approach wherein
a variation of 10 to 15% between the largest and smallest district would
be constitutionally permissible. Mr. Justice Fortas, however, would not
set a fixed standard for permissible variation, agreeing with the majority
that such an approach demeans the constitutional objective by suggesting
that equality need never be the aim.
39. 394 U.S. at 553.
40. This confusion may also explain Mr. Justice White's criticism that the Court
failed to distinguish congressional from state legislative districting.
41. 394 U.S. at 549. See note 14 supra.
42. Id. at 537. This is an inaccurate reading of the majority's opinion which
required justification "[u]nless population variances among congressional districts
are shown to have resulted despite ...

[a good faith] .

.

. effort.. .

."

394 U.S. at 531

(emphasis added). See p. 224 supra.
43. 394 U.S. at 537. While the Court rejects the justifications on these facts,
it does state, in dicta, that the considerations of population trends, and perhaps nonvoter population are still viable justifications for some variance. See notes 31 and
32 supra.
44. Id. at 538, 556. Mr. Justice Fortas, however, qualifies this statement by
commenting that "[tlhe majority opinion does not suggest so extreme a practical
application of its teaching, and I mention it only because the example may dramatize
the fallacy of inflexible insistence upon mathematical exactness, with no tolerance
for reality."
Id. atCharles
538 .Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Harlan, in separate dissenting
opinions, further contend that the effect of the majority's decision, while
requiring unnecessarily stringent adherence to mathematics, actually facilitates the task of gerrymandering. In support of this proposition, both
Justices invoke language from Reynolds that "[i]ndiscriminate districting,
without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering." 45 However, neither include Reynolds' subsequent statement that
. . . if, even as a result of a clearly rational state policy of according
some legislative representation to political subdivisions, population
is submerged as the controlling consideration . . . then the right of

all of the State's citizens to cast an effective46 and adequately weighted
vote would be unconstitutionally impaired.
Mr. Justice Harlan in the instant decision, states furthermore that
. the Court's exclusive concentration upon arithmetic blinds it to the
realities of the political process . . . [and] . . . is perfectly compatible

with 'gerrymandering' of the worst sort." 47 He concludes that "[t]he
legislature must do more than satisfy one man-one vote; it must create
a structure which will in fact as well as theory be responsive to the sentiments of the community." 48 Thus, Justices White, Harlan, and Stewart
dissent, while Mr. Justice Fortas, though criticizing the standard enun49
ciated by the majority, concurs in the result.

As previously suggested, it is submitted that the Justices' common
criticism - that the Court has laid down a requirement of mathematical
perfection - is unfounded. The majority made its decision not because
of a violation of mathematics, but because of the states' obvious ability to
approach nearer to equality, and their lack of good faith effort in that regard.
The criticism which the dissent levels at the majority that its "concentration upon arithmetic blinds it to the realities of the political process" 50
seems most fitting to be turned around against its authors. The majority
has looked past the arithmetic and into the political realities of Missouri
and New York, and has found considerations therein which violate a
constitutional requirement. The dissenting Justices refuse to search beyond
the arithmetic and urge non-interference with the state's legislative districting without examining either the states' motivations or possible alternatives.
The criticism of judicial district-making is also unwarranted. The
majority makes clear that it is not establishing any fixed standard. Rather
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).

46. Id. at 581.
47. 394 U.S. at 551.
48. Id. at 551.
49. Mr. Justice Fortas agrees with the district court's rejection of Missouri's
statute on the basis of Missouri's reapportionment history, and failure in their latest
effort to use accurate data. Id. at 540-41. He concurred in Wells, stating that New
York ". . . may not substantially or grossly disregard population or residence figures
in order to recognize regional groupings within the state." 394 U.S. 542, 549 (1969).
See Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 495 (1968).
50. 394 U.S. at 551.
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than requiring judicial intrusion into the legislative business of districting
to resolve minor squabbles of a few percentage points,5 Priesler only
requires the courts' intervention where, as in Missouri and New York, equal
representation was clearly subordinated to other unacceptable considerations.
The second common basis for complaint is that Preisler's allegedly
stringent standard does nothing to combat the gerrymander, and may even
encourage it by eliminating the "political subdivision consideration." The
latter point is questionable in that there has been no previous requirement
on legislatures to strictly conform to political subdivisions, and gerrymandering in disregard of those subdivisions was always possible. The
gerrymanderer at least faces some obstacle when equal numbers of people
must be placed in each district.52 It is true, however, that the Court's
newly elucidated requirement of population equality is no guarantee against
gerrymandering or unfair representation. This point would probably not
be challenged by any of the Justices, but it lends no support to the dissent.
Though the Court has not dealt with the question to any great extent,
it is indisputable that gerrymandering is an important problem effecting
equal representation."3 In Wells, the second basis of constitutional attack
was that the statute represented "a systematic and intentional partisan
gerrymander violating Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 54 The issue was here again not reached because
of the disposition of Wells on the basis of population inequality. 55
But the importance and difficulty of judicial resolution of the gerrymandering problem should have no effect on the Court's present task of
51. Id. at 556. This is part of Justice White's dissent.
52. The majority has adequately answered this criticism:
It is dubious in any event that the temptation to gerrymander would be much
inhibited, since the legislature would still be free to choose which of several subdivisions, all with their own political complexion, to include in a particular
congressional district. Besides, opportunities for gerrymandering are greatest
when there is freedom to construct unequally populated districts. "[T]he artistry
of the political cartographer is put to its highest test when he must work with
constituencies of equal population. At such times, his skills can be compared to
those of a surgeon, for both work under fixed and arduous rules. However, if
the mapmaker is free to allocate varying populations to different districts, then
the butcher's cleaver replaces the scalpel; and the results reflect sharply the
difference in the method of operation." Hacker, Congressional Districting (1964
rev. ed.).
Id. at 534 n.4.
53. Only in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), did the Court reach the
merits of a gerrymandering case, holding that the altering of Alabama municipal lines
to exclude Negro voters violated the fifteenth amendment. See 6 VILL. L. Rtv.
411 (1961).
The issue of racial gerrymandering was before the Supreme Court in three
other cases, but no decision on the merits was forthcoming from any of these cases.
Connor v. Johnson, 386 U.S. 483 (1967) ; Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) ;
and Honeywood v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 222 (1964). See generally Comment,
Political Gerrymandering: The Law And Politics Of Partisan Districting, 36 Gxo.
WAsH. L. Rnv. 144 (1967) ; Comment, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions Plus a Problem of Proof, 72 YALZ L.J.
1041 (1963).
54. 394 U.S. at 544.
55. Dean McKay, counsel for the appellant in Wells, inaccurately prognosticated
in 1968 that the, "[decision of these cases [Preisler and Wells] should provide
guidance on the remaining question . . . of gerrymandering." 67 MIcH. L. Rxv.
235 (1968).
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assuring equal representation. Mr. Justice Harlan's insistence that "[tihe
legislature must do more than satisfy one man-one vote .

. .,

should not

mean that the pursuit of this standard should be curtailed. Because the
attainment of equal district population does not itself create perfect representation, that is no reason to abandon or compromise the effort to attain
this constitutionally required goal.
Since Baker the Court has indicated its determination to achieve the
one man-one vote goal. But also since Baker the criticism has arisen that
the Court's standards were not definite enough to be followed by courts
or legislatures. 57 The Court's elucidation of the requisite standard in
Preisler reflects its realization that the factor most essential to the
attainment of equal representation is genuine effort to that end by the
state legislatures. Thus, the Court requires not mathematical perfection,
but an honest, good faith effort to achieve absolute equality. A state plan
which falls short of absolute equality may still meet this standard, but
those which sacrifice that goal in deference to other objectives shall not.
Clearly Missouri and New York made such an impermissible sacrifice.
When the sacrificial act is as clear in other states, with resultant population variances, judicial correction can be expected in order to achieve, in
Wesberry's terms, "the Constitution's plain objective of making equal
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the
House of Representatives." 58
Michael R. Stiles

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF FIFTH AMENDMENT

-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

APPLICATION

DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE TO THE STATES

THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Benton v. Maryland (U.S. 1969)
Petitioner, indicted on charges of burglary and larceny, was convicted of burglary, but found not guilty of larceny, and sentenced to
ten years in prison. After his notice of appeal was filed, the Maryland
court of appeals declared invalid a provision of the Maryland Constitution' which required grand and petit jurors to declare their belief in
the existence of God. 2 As a result of this decision, the court of appeals
56. 394 U.S. at 551.

57. See note 10 supra. See also Irwin, Representation and Election: The
Reapportionment Cases In Retrospect, 67 MICH. L. Rgv. 729 (1969).
58. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
1. MD. CONST. art. 36 (1867).
2. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
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remanded petitioner's case to the trial court, where he chose not to
accept the conviction and requested a new trial. He was reindicted and
retried on charges of burglary and larceny. The trial judge denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss the larceny charge, despite his objection
that this was violative of the federal constitutional prohibition against
subjecting persons to double jeopardy for the same offense.8 Convicted
of both charges, he was given concurrent sentences of fifteen years on
the burglary charge 4 and five years on the larceny charge. On appeal,
the Maryland court of special appeals rejected petitioner's double jeopardy
claim on the merits 5 and the Maryland court of appeals denied discretionary review. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a
six to two decision, reversed petitioner's conviction for larceny, holding
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to
the states. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
The United States Constitution provides that
• . . [no] person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb .... 1
The double jeopardy standard applied by the Court in federal prosecutions was first announced in 1896 in United States v. Ball,7 where the
Government alleged its own error in seeking to obtain a new trial.
The Court refused to allow the Government to deprive the defendant
of the benefit of acquittal by the jury, and ruled that an acquittal is
final, ends the defendant's jeopardy, and bars subsequent prosecution
8
for the same offense.
The Court more specifically defined federal standards of double
jeopardy to be applied by the federal courts in the case of Green v.
United States.0 The petitioner in Green had been convicted of second
degree murder at his first trial, and on appeal, that conviction was
reversed. On retrial, he was convicted of first degree murder. Relying
heavily on Ball, the Court held that this second trial for first degree
3. Maryland is one of five states whose constitution does not prohibit placing
an accused in jeopardy more than once for the same offense; the other states are
Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont. 17 AM. U.L. Rgv. 500 n.7
(1968).

See

LEGISLATIvn DRATING RgSEtARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, INDIX

CONSTITUTIONs 576 (2d ed. 1959). However, the above states recognize the prohibition against double jeopardy as part of their common law in at least
some instances. State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464,
121 A. 354 (1923) ; Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N.E. 633 (1931) ;
State v. Clemmons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.E. 760 (1934) ; State v. O'Brien 106 Vt. 97,
170 A. 98 (1934), cited in Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 n.6 (1953)
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
4. The State of Maryland is presently appealing to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit a federal district court order to resentence petitioner.
This order was granted after a habeas corpus proceeding. Benton v. Copinger, 291
F. Supp. 141 (D. Md. 1968),
5. 1 Md. App. 647, 232 A.2d 541 (1967).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
8. Id. at 671.
9. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
DIGEST To STATE
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murder placed Green in jeopardy twice for the same offense, in violation
of the Constitution.' ° Based on the rationale that the federal government
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual, the Court found that an acquittal is
final, ending the defendant's jeopardy. Once the jury is discharged, a
defendant may not be tried again, and the Government has no right
to appeal for a new trial. A defendant can be tried a second time for the
same offense only when his prior conviction for that offense has been
set aside on appeal."
Although the federal courts were always subject to these strict
standards, the double jeopardy clause had never been made applicable
to the states. The primary reason was that the Court had traditionally
followed the doctrine of selective incorporation, enunciated in an earlier
double jeopardy case, Palko v. Connecticut,12 in deciding which constitutional guarantees were applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment due process clause. According to this rule, only those specific
guarantees which had "been found implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"' 8 were included.
The recent trend of the Court has been to reject Palko's restrictiveness by incorporating all of the protections of the Bill of Rights directed
at criminal proceedings. This trend started in 1961, when the Court
applied the fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 14 The Court later applied the following protections of the
Bill of Rights to the states: protection from cruel and unusual punishment ;15 right to counsel at trial; 16 right to counsel during interrogation ;17
freedom from compelled self-incrimination ;18 freedom from comment
on defendant's failure to testify;19 right to confront witnesses;20 and

the right to jury trial on a serious criminal offense. 21
10. The Court rejected the Government's argument that Green's appeal of his
second degree murder conviction waived his constitutional defense of former jeopardy.
The Court referred to the standard required by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), that in order for a waiver of a constitutional right to be valid, such waiver
must be a voluntary, knowing relinquishment of that right. Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184. 191-92 (1957).
11. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
12. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
13. Id. at 325.
14. Mapp v. Ohio ,367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
17. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
18. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
19. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
20. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
21. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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Although there have been several attempts2 2 and some pressure to

23
incorporate the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment,
it appears that the double jeopardy clause was the last significant protection
of the Bill of Rights that had not yet been applied to the states through

22. The first attempt to apply the double jeopardy clause to the states was made
in Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85 (1902). The Court found it unnecessary to
reach that question in disposing of the case. Petitioner in Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), urged the same application, but the Court held that the double
jeonprdy clause specifically did not apply to the states. Since Palko, the Court has
had the issue of double jeopardy in a state proceeding before it seven times in the
following cases: Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S.
1020 (1967) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358
U.S. 576 (1959) ; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 464 (1958)
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) ; Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
In Cichos, the Court was faced with a problem similar to the one in Green.
Petitioner was tried on two counts (reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter)
and found guilty of reckless homicide. On appeal, the Indiana supreme court granted
him a new trial where he was retried on the same two counts. The jury returned the
same verdict as at the first trial, and petitioner received the same sentence. The
Supreme Court upheld the Indiana court's affirmance of petitioner's conviction at the
second trial notwithstanding the fact that the verdict at the first trial was silent as
to the involuntary manslaughter charge. The Court refused to hold that the jury's
silence on the involuntary manslaughter charge amounted to acquittal. Instead, the
Court accepted the Indiana court's interpretation of state law, that a verdict of guilty
of the reckless homicide charge at the first trial does not exclude a subsequent verdict
of guilty of the overlapping offense of involuntary manslaughter.
The Court justified its refusal to reach the double jeopardy issue presented on
the grounds that the Indiana statute and case law allowed treatment of the charges
as one offense, allowing the jury the discretion to set the range of petitioner's sentence.
Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966). However, Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting, was
of the opinion that the case presented substantially the same question as did Green.
The only significant difference to him was that in Green, the petitioner was convicted
of the lesser offense at his first trial, and of the greater offense at his second trial;
and that under Green, the state should not have been allowed to retry Cichos on the
more serious charge of involuntary manslaughter since the jury had failed to return a
finding of guilty on that count at the first trial. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76, 80-81
(1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting). For a study of the Court's denial of certiorari in
thirty-five cases which have raised substantial issues of double jeopardy, see Hanus,
Denial of Certiorari and Supreme Court Policy-Making, 17 AM. U.L. Rv. 41,
48-52 (1967).
23. In United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 913 (1966), the Second Circuit held:
To hold as we do, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes some restrictions on a state's power to reprosecute, thereby spanning
the gap between the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition and a similar
prohibition derived from state laws, is to preserve this societal understanding
and to read the Fourteenth Amendment as entrusting the federal courts with a
responsibility and power to decide which reprosecutions by a state violate our
basic notions of justice.
Several commentators have also endorsed the idea of incorporating the double jeopardy
provision. See Hanus, Denial of Certiorari and Supreme Court Policy-Making, 17
AM. U.L. Rtv. 41 (1967) ; Note, Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 4 CRIM.
L. BULL. 406 (1968) ; Comment, Double Jeopardy: Its History, Rationale and Future,
70 DICK. L. Rpv. 377 (1966) ; Note, Double Jeopardy: A Vanishing Constitutional
Right, 14 How. L.J. 360 (1968) ; Comment, Double Jeopardy and Due Process, 59
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 247 (1968) ; Note, Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy,
13 N.Y.L.F. 133 (1967) ; Comment, Double Jeopardy and the Doctrine of Manifest
Necessity, 20 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rpv. 189 (1965) ; Comment, Double Jeopardy v.
Double Punishment - Confusion in California, 2 SAN DinGo L. Rnv. 86 (1965);
Comment, Multiple Prosecution: Federalism v. Individual Rights, 20 U. FLA. L. Rpv.
355 (1968). But see Note, An Epilogue to Cichos: Double Jeopardy Examined, 17
Am. U.L. Rgv. 500 (1968).
For an analysis of the development of the policies behind the double jeopardy
protection, see generally J. SIGLUR, DOUBL4 JSOPARDY (1969).
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the fourteenth amendment.2 4 This omission has been corrected by the
Court's decision in the instant case. In fact, there is now a total incorporation of the significant protections of the first eight amendments,25
although in theory, the selective incorporation doctrine of Palko is
26
still viable.
In order to reach the double jeopardy issue, the Court had to overcome two procedural problems arising out of the petitioner's conviction
on two separate counts of burglary and larceny. First, the Court found
that there was a justiciable case or controversy. Even though the petitioner would not receive a reduction in his sentence if his appeal was
successful, the Court recognized that there were adverse legal consequences involved in a criminal conviction. 27 Secondly, the Court held
that the concurrent sentence doctrine 28 was a rule of judicial conveni24. See Hanus, supra note 23, at 44.

25. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
summarized:
[M]any of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
stitution have been held to be protected against state
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause

(1968),

where the Court

Amendments to the Conaction by the Due Process
now protects the right to

compensation for property taken by the State [citing Chicago, B.&Q.R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)]; the rights of speech, press and religion
covered by the First Amendent [citing See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927)]; the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally
seized [citing See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)]; the right guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination [citing Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)] ; and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel [citing
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)], to a speedy [citing Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)], and public [citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948)] trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses [citing Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)] and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
[citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)].
Some protections of the Bill of Rights have not yet been incorporated through the
fourteenth amendment - the fifth amendment protection against being held without
a presentment or indictment by a grand jury, the seventh amendment right to jury
trial in non-criminal proceedings where the amount in controversy exceeds $20.00,
and the eighth amendment protection against excessive bail and fines.
26. 395 U.S. at 794.
27. This finding was based on the rationale noted in Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 55 (1968), that "most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral
legal consequences." The Court illustrated two of the potential adverse consequences
of petitioner's criminal conviction by citing examples of the possible use of a recidivist
statute by a state to enhance punishment for a later offense, or the possible impeachment of his character if his testimony were sought in a future trial. 395 U.S. at 790-91.
28. 395 U.S. at 791. The origins of the concurrent sentence doctrine were traced
by the Court to Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813), where it
was held that the existence of one sufficient count out of eleven rendered consideration
of challenges to all eleven counts unnecessary. Id. at 344. The Court next quoted
Claasen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891), where it was held that challenges to
other counts need not be considered if there had been a valid conviction on any one
count. Id. at 146. According to the Court, the case most frequently cited to bolster
the invocation of the concurrent sentence doctrine in recent times is Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), where the Court found it unnecessary to consider
a challenge to one count in a conviction since the conviction on the second count was
determined to be valid. Id. at 105.
The failure to apply consistently the concurrent sentence doctrine is noted
in United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1958). In that case, instances
of the selective use of the doctrine to deny review, or the avoidance of the doctrine
to allow review are reported. The conclusion reached in Hines and approved in
Benton, is that the concurrent sentence doctrine is not a hard and fast rule, but rather,
a matter of judicial discretion. In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943),
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ence rather than a jurisdictional bar to consideration of challenges to
29
multiple convictions.
The Court seized upon the opportunity to abandon the rationale
of Palko, as it had abandoned the similar rationale of Betts v. Brady0
in Gideon v. Wainwright8 1 and that of Twining v. New Jersey 2 in
Malloy v. Hogan.8s Finding the Palko rule of inclusion too restrictive,
the Court chose to adopt the approach set forth in Duncan v. Louisiana
"[oJnce it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
'fundamental to the American scheme of justice,' the same constitutional
standards apply against both the State and Federal governments. 8' 4
Deciding that the double jeopardy clause was fundamental, the Court
merely superimposed upon the states the rules governing the federal
courts as enunciated in Ball and Green. 5 This definition of federal
double jeopardy standards is not exhaustive of those protections which
have been applied by federal courts.86 While some states may go further
than the Court goes in Benton in providing an accused with double
jeopardy protection,8 7 the minimum standard imposed on the states
the Court noted three exceptions which would justify ignoring the concurrent sentence
doctrine: 1) where the petitioner would be subject to further penalties under state
or federal law after the judgment against him was satisfied, 2) where the effect of an
injunction would operate in futuro, and 3) where the effect of a judgment might impair
petitioner's credibility as a witness in any future legal proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Benton detailed several instances of its own use or
avoidance of the concurrent sentence doctrine. The Court summarized its recent
decisions on the question of mootness in criminal cases which have recognized the
existence of a justiciable case or controversy notwithstanding the existence of a
valid concurrent sentence. The latest leading case in this area is Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968), in which the Court held that a criminal case did not become moot
upon the expiration of the sentence imposed, noting that most criminal convictions do,
in fact, entail adverse collateral legal consequences. The possibility of such consequences makes the challenge of such a conviction a justiciable case or controversy.
Id. at 55. That same rationale was used in Benton to justify the finding of a justiciable
case or controversy notwithstanding a valid concurrent sentence.
In rejecting the Hirabayashi rule in favor of the Sibron rule, the Court held
that "the concurrent sentence rule may have some continuing validity as a rule of
judicial convenience . . . there is no jurisdictional bar to consideration of challenges
to multiple convictions, even though concurrent sentences were imposed." Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969). But see 5 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2220, at 440 (12th ed. 1957); Note, Court Treatment of General
Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 238 (1948) ; 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 560 (1953)
cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
29. 395 U.S. at 791.
30. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
33. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
34. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969), citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
35. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957), citing United States v.
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
36. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have dealt with several double
jeopardy situations not considered in Ball, Green, nor Benton. For an extensive
treatment of federal action in these other areas, see Orfield, Double Jeopardy in
Federal Criminal Cases, 3 CAL. WEST. L. Rev. 76 (1967). See also Note, Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy, 13 N.Y.L.F. 133, 139-44 (1967).
37. See Note, An Epilogue to Cichos: Double Jeopardy Examined, 17 Am. U.L.
Riv. 500, 537 (1968).
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by Benton will provide defendants with "substantial fairness"3 8 in regard
to double jeopardy in all criminal prosecutions, state or federal.
Critics of the Benton decision have several legitimate objections
to the Court's rule in this case. One serious criticism raised by the
dissent is that the Court could have reversed petitioner's larceny conviction on the grounds that his retrial on that count was a denial of due
process, for which reversal would be required under Palko.s 9 This course
of action would have required a new interpretation of the Palko standard
of due process to be binding on the states under the fourteenth amendment. A finding that double jeopardy is not one of those legitimate
state interests protected under Palko would not have offended those
who resist incorporation and would have been a far less sweeping
step than wholesale incorporation of the double jeopardy clause. The
Court could have avoided the fifth amendment issue by utilizing the
technique suggested by Mr. Justice Harlen in his concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut,40 and concentrated solely on fourteenth amendment due process to determine if the state court procedure did indeed
violate "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "
This alternative method of reversing petitioner's larceny conviction
would have had another, and quite possibly beneficial effect, in that states
would have been encouraged to develop their own standards of double
jeopardy, instead of merely conforming to the minimum federal standard.
One commentator is of the opinion that
[O]ne must wonder whether it would be wise to place states that
have been trailblazers in the double jeopardy area under the federal
thumb, when, in many ways, federal double jeopardy has been
rather backward . . . Although states are certainly free to apply

stricter standards in the criminal area after incorporation, this is
seldom the case. It is always easier, and safer on review to merely
follow the minimum requirements. Moreover, much of the federal
double jeopardy law is still greatly unsettled in areas wherein the
states have well-settled and well-understood principles. It is quite
possible that incorporation in this area, to correct what might seem
to be one gross injustice in a particular case would do more harm
than good when viewed from the broad spectrum of double jeopardy
in the fifty states, rather than from the narrow fulcrum of an
41
isolated complaint.
Another valid criticism is that the Court decided a constitutional
question in disposing of the case, when it could have refused to do so
by applying the concurrent sentence doctrine.4 2 Thus, Justice Harlan's
view that the Court has "actually been at pains to 'reach out' to decide
38. Id.
39. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 809-13 (1969) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,
dissenting).
40. 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
41. See note 37 supra.
42. See note 28 supra.
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that very important constitutional issue" cannot be disputed.43 Similarly,
the Court's justification for "reaching out" to consider the double jeopardy
issue is questionable - that since the state court reached the double
jeopardy issue, the Supreme Court could reach that issue as well. 4 4 The

Court's invocation of the collateral estoppel doctrine for the purpose of
remanding petitioner's burglary conviction is also weak. 45
Whether the Court will periodically revise the standards of double
jeopardy applied to the states and to the lower federal courts to keep
pace with changing requirements of substantial fairness remains to be
seen. The Court has been willing to revise standards imposed in the
area of wire tapping and electronic surveillance to protect the fourth
amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures as evidenced by the Berger-Katz-Alderman line of cases. 46 However, in view
of the fact that double jeopardy does not present such an offensive
threat to personal liberty as does the clandestine invasion of one's private
conversations in the bugging cases, 47 it is unlikely that the Court will
move with the same deliberation and insistency in the double jeopardy
area as it has in the electronic surveillance area.
The application of the double jeopardy claui;e to the states will
not have any startling effect on most of those forty-five states which
have their own state constitutional protections gaint double jeopardy.4"
43. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801, 806 (1969) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ.,

dissenting), citing Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1909)
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
44. 395 U.S. at 792-93, 806.
45. The Court remanded petitioner's burglary conviction for determination of the
issue of collateral estoppel raised by petitioner below, as this was not considered by
the Maryland court. Petitioner claimed that the burglary conviction was affected by
the double jeopardy violation since evidence admissible on the larceny charge, but not
admissible on a charge of burglary alone, was used to convict him. Petitioner argued
that this evidence should have been excluded from the second trial under the collateral
estoppel doctrine, since he was acquitted of larceny at the first trial. Mr. Justice
Harlan in his dissent joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, objected to the remand of the
burglary conviction. The fact that part of the evidence introduced at petitioner's
second trial was relevant to both counts of burglary and larceny, presented no question
of its admissibility at a trial on burglary alone to the dissenting Justices, even
assuming that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in some form to the states.
The dissent cited dictum in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470-77 (1958), that
"[diespite its wide employment, we entertain grave doubts whether collateral estoppel
can be regarded as a constitutional requirement. Certainly this Court has never so
held." Justices Harlan and Stewart further argued in Benton that:
The principle of collateral estoppel makes conclusive, in collateral proceedings,
only those matters which were "actually litigated and determined in the original
action" ...
Hence petitioner's acquittal of larceny at his first trial may have
rested solely upon that jury's unique view of the law concerning that offense,
and cannot be taken as having necessarily "determined" any particular question
of fact.
395 U.S. at 804.
The dissent concluded that contrary to the majority's position, there could be
no collateral estoppel effect in a collateral proceeding and that petitioner's collateral
estoppel argument on the burglary conviction must fail. 395 U.S. at 798-804 (Harlan
& Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See also Note, Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel,
4 CRIM. L. BULL. 406 (1968).

46. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) ; Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) ; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
47. Cf. 14 VILL. L. Rzv. 758 (1969).
48. See INDEX DIGEST TO STATE

CONSTITUTIONS,

supra note 3.
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However, the constitutional provisions of six of these forty-five states,

49
as they are written, limit double jeopardy protection to capital cases.

Only five of those six states have extended their double jeopardy protection, consistent with the extension of the federal protection, to cover
non-capital cases as well.50 The one state with a constitutional double
jeopardy provision still limited to capital cases is Pennsylvania. 5' It is
clear that Benton requires extension of this protection in Pennsylvania
now to non-capital cases.
The impact Benton will have on the five states,52 including Maryland,
having only common law protection against double jeopardy will be more
pronounced, especially if the standards announced in Green are stricter
than the common law precedent in those states.
The Court in Benton gave no indication of whether its decision would
apply to juvenile or administrative proceedings. The case for its application to juvenile proceedings is strong, in that there, as well as at criminal
trial, an accused can be deprived of his liberty. Constitutional safeguards are applicable to any such proceeding. 3
The Court's overruling that part of Palko that had formerly excluded the states from the double jeopardy clause will have little new
effect beyond its present incorporation, imposing federal double jeopardy
standards on the states. Benton is another step in the Court's attempt to
incorporate significant federal constitutional protections through the
fourteenth amendment. The idea of selective incorporation is still viable,
but since most of the significant protections of the Bill of Rights have
now been "selectively incorporated" 54 the Court has in fact, if not in
word, accepted the substance of Justices Black and Douglas' appeal for
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights.55
F. J.Nyhan
49. Id.

50. The federal double jeopardy protection was extended to cover non-capital
cases, both felonies and misdemeanors in Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163
(1874). The annotated constitutions of five of those six states each cite state court
common law authority for extending the double jeopardy protection to non-capital
cases. Those five states and the relevant constitutional provisions are Alabama, ALA.
CONSTr. art. I, § 9; Deleware, D4L. CONST. art. I, § 8; Kentucky, Ky. CoNsT. art. 13;
Maine, Mn. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; Tennessee, TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
51. Pennsylvania's refusal to extend this protection under its common law dates
from 1857 where, in the case of McCreary v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 323, 325 (1857),
the court cited dicta from earlier cases in restricting the double jeopardy protection to
capital cases. This position has been directly affirmed as recently as 1965, in the
case of Commonwealth ex rel. Papy v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 368, 207 A.2d 814 (1965)
and again in 1967, in the cases of Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d
177 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967).
52. See note 3 supra.
53. See United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958) (juvenile
proceeding). See also Comment, In re Harry Bridges, 52 YALz L.J. 108 (1942)
(deportation proceeding). For a more detailed treatment of this aspect of juvenile
proceedings, see Rubin, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 16 CLVv.-MAR. L.
Riv. 477 (1967), and Note, Double Jeopardy and Due Process in the Juvenile Courts,
29 U. PITT. L. REv. 756 (1968).
54. See notes 14-21, 25 supra.
55. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black & Douglas,

JJ., dissenting).
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LIMITING THE

PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO AN ARREST.

Chimel v. California (U.S. 1969)
Three police officers arrived at petitioner's home with a warrant
authorizing his arrest for burglary. Although no search warrant had been
issued and petitioner objected, an extensive 45 minute search of his threeroom home, garage and workshop was conducted prior to his removal to
police headquarters. At the subsequent state trial, the evidence obtained
by the search was admitted over petitioner's objections. His conviction
was affirmed by both the California District Court of Appeals' and the
California Supreme Court 2 on the basis that the warrantless search of
petitioner's home was justified as being incident to a lawful arrest. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the permissible scope
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must be limited to the arrestee's
person and the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence; all other searches, in the absence of wellrecognized exceptions, 3 may only be made after a search warrant has been
obtained. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
The history of warrantless searches incident to a lawful arrest has
had a stormy existence marked by much misunderstanding and, in some
instances, quick reversals. 4 The first decision to give any indication of
the reasonable extent of an incidental search was Weeks v. United
States.' However, in Weeks the Court made no mention of the right to
search the area where the arrest occurred, but limited the scope of the
search to the arrestee's person. Eleven years later, the case of Agnello
v. United States established, by way of dictum, the right to conduct a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. Soon after, in Marron v. United
States,7 the Supreme Court expanded the Agnello dictum and for the first
time allowed a search which extended beyond the room where the arrest
1.
2.
3.
4.

People v. Chimel, 61 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1967).
People v. Chimel, 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
See note 19 infra.
For a detailed survey of the background of incidental search, see R. DAvIs,
FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 152 (1964); W. LAFAv9, ARREST: THE DECISION
To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965) ; Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261.
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). "What then is the present case? . . . It is not an
assertion of the right on the part of government, always recognized under English
and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Id. at 392.
6. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Court in Agnello stated:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things
to effect an escape from custody, is not doubted. ...
Id. at 30.

7. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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was made to an area adjacent to that room. In Marron, as in Agnello,
the search of the premises was dependent upon the fact that the crime
was committed in the presence of the officer.8 In fact, every Supreme
Court decision prior to 1947 which had allowed an incidental search
beyond the person involved cases in which an officer was present at the
time of the offense. 9
The evolving trend which tended to limit warrantless, incidental
searches to those cases in which a crime was committed in the presence
of an officer ceased with the decision of Harrisv. United States.'0 There,
the extensive search of a four-room apartment was held to be valid as
incident to arrest, despite the fact that the federal agent did not witness
the crime and that the search extended considerably beyond the defendant's person.
The final Supreme Court decision having a bearing on the scope of
an incidental search, and the one on which the California supreme court"
primarily relied in affirming Chimel's conviction was United States v.
Rabinowitz.12 There, the Supreme Court specifically overruled the then
current Trupiano'3 decision, which had made warrantless, incidental
searches unreasonable per se in any situation where it was practical for
the officers to obtain a warrant. The test, the Rabinowitz Court stated,
8. The fact that the Marron opinion did not mean all that it seemed to say

became evident a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), where an incidental
search of the three rooms adjacent to the one in which the arrest was made was
disallowed because it could not be said that the officers witnessed a crime being
committed in their presence, and because there would have been ample time to obtain
a search warrant. It is obvious that Mr. Justice Butler, who wrote the opinion in
both Go-Bart and Lefkowitz, intended to limit the Marron case.
9. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Although the
failure of the Supreme Court to make any affirmative statements concerning the right
to conduct a search incidental to a lawful arrest where the crime was not committed
in the officer's presence does not necessarily rule out the possibility; these cases are
a strong indication that the Court did not intend the arrest to supercede the warrant
requirements of the fourth amendment.
10. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
11. 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, 67 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968).
12. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Rabinowitz established the proposition that a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest may extend to the area within the defendant's
"immediate control." However, no guidelines were presented to aid the courts in
determining what that area might be. Law enforcement officers have used this
language to justify an increase in the physical area of incidental search. As a result,
Rabinowitz has come to stand for the proposition that "immediate control" includes
the entire area that is considered to be in the possession or under the control of the
person arrested. See, e.g., Kernick v. United States, 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957)
(on probable cause for possession of heroin, officers searched the suspect's person and
found a baggage check. They secured the baggage and found nine ounces of heroin.
The court held that the suitcase was within the "constructive possession" of the
prisoner) ; Bartlett v. United States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956) (allowed a search
of the motel rooms occupied by two escaped convicts, where the arrests were executed
immediately outside, on the theory that the room was within the arrestee's control) ;
Clifton v. United States, 224 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1955) (court upheld an incidental
search of a home when the arrest took place in the yard).
13. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). In overruling Trupiano, the
Court returned to its earlier decisions in Marron and Harris, which had held that the
police have the right to search the area within the immediate control of the arrestee
as an incident to the arrest and a search warrant is not a necessary prerequisite.
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"is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable.' u4 Today, therefore, an incidental search may
be made in any type arrest: (1) with a warrant' 5 ; (2) without a warrant where the offense is committed in the presence of the officer1 6 ; or
(3) without a warrant where the officer has probable cause to believe
7
that a crime is being committed or has been committed.'
Against this background, the Supreme Court in Chimel endeavored
to define more precisely the permissible scope of a warrantless search
incident to an arrest. An extensive historical analysis indicated to the
Court that the "reasonableness" test established by Rabinowitz was too
imprecise to be constitutionally viable, and therefore new guidelines for
limiting the scope of incidental searches were established. These guidelines provide that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the suspect's person and the area within his immediate
control for weapons or any readily accessible evidence. The phrase "within
his immediate control" was construed by the Court to mean the area from
within which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' 8 The search cannot extend beyond the room in which the
arrest was made or even to concealed areas within that room itself. All
incidental searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions,'" can
be made only with a warrant.
In establishing the above guidelines, the Court directly overruled
Rabinowitz and Harris in so far as they would allow, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, warrantless searches outside of the arrestee's
immediate control. In so doing, the Court rejected any possibility of
distinguishing Chimel from Rabinowitz and Harris on a factual basis
even though it could have applied the Rabinowitz test and found the
search unreasonable because it ranged well beyond the room where the
arrest was made, 20 or as petitioner argued, that the arrest was engineered
as to time and place in order to facilitate an unreasonable, exploratory
14. 339 U.S. at 66 (1950).
15. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Cutchlow v. United States,
301 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1962); Zammar v. United States, 217 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.
1959) ;United States v. Lord, 184 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ; United States v. Gorman, 36
F.R.D. 416 (D. Conn. 1965) ; United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
17. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961); Washington v.
United States, 263 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Barnes v. Beto, 247 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.
Tex. 1964). See R. DAVIs, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (1964) ; Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261.
18. 395 U.S. at 763.
19. Examples of categories of searches recognized as being exceptions to the
warrant requirement are those of "hot pursuit," as shown in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) ; a peculiar need to act quickly, as in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (immediate blood test permissible where after delay it would not
indicate presence of alcohol); search of a moving vehicle, as in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; and the common law exception of consent.
20. See Whitely v. United States, 237 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Drayton v.
United States. 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
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search. 21 Instead, Mr. Justice Stewart described these factual distinctions
as "artificial," and stated that the same rationale that allowed the less
extensive searches in Rabinowitz and Harris would also have permitted
the more extensive search in the instant case. 22 Therefore, the "reason-

ableness" rationale established by Rabinowitz to determine the scope of
incidental searches was rejected in favor of an added emphasis on the
warrant procedure 23 and also redefined limitations on the scope of warrantless searches. 24 The original objectives of incidental search - protection
of the officer and prevention of concealment or destruction of evidence are re-established as the basis for justifying the search and limiting its
scope. 25 Or stated differently, Chimel now limits contemporaneous searches
to those which can be justified by the need to seize weapons or destructible evidence and additionally to those situations where the arrest itself
might be frustrated if the officer was required to obtain a warrant.
Rabinowitz, on the other hand, had expressly held that the exceptions
for searches incident to an arrest were not limited to those situations mentioned above, but allowed any contemporaneous search that was found to
be "reasonable" under all the circumstances, regardless of whether it would
have been practical to obtain a warrant.
The Court recognized that the result of the Rabinowitz approach was
to extend the scope of incidental search to such a point that fourth amendment protection in this area was virtually non-existent, 26 since the
'reasonableness" standard failed to establish any criteria or basis for
21. The courts have uniformly condemned searches incident to an arrest where
it is clear that the arrest was arranged solely as a pretext for conducting a search.
For example, even though police may have ample opportunity to arrest a suspect on
the street, they may wait to arrest him after he arrives home so that they might
engage in a general, warrantless search of his premises. See Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958) ; Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961);
McNight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Johnson,
113 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1953).
22. 395 U.S. at 766.
23. The Court's holding that a search warrant be obtained whenever practical is
a harkening back to the rationale of Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948),
which held that the acquisition of a warrant where practical was a necessary condition
for reasonableness.
24. Although the court doesn't specifically mention it, its increased attention to
the limitations in the scope of incidental search appears to be attributable to the
demise of the "mere evidence" rule established in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921), which limited the evidence which could be seized to the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime. Since the evidence had to be limited to these items, it placed
some theoretical limitations on the scope of the search. Under Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), evidence of guilt as well as fruits of the crime could be seized.
Thus, a search could be termed a general exploration only if it was aimed at finding
evidence of some other crime. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. Rev.
69, 117-22 (1967).
25. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
26. The limiting factor established by the Rabinowitz Court - that the area to
be searched as incident to the arrest extend no further than the area under the
arrestee's immediate control - has not been maintained by lower courts. See United
States v. Wise, 190 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1961) (a search that extended to the other
rooms of a dwelling house was upheld even though the arrest was made in the
kitchen) ; People v. Braden, 34 Ill. 2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808 (1966) (validating a
search of an apartment plus a refrigerator and a closet outside of the apartment);
State v. Miller, 47 N.J. 273, 220 A.2d 409 (1966) (extended the area under the
"control" of the arrestee to another's residence which the suspect was visiting).
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determining the limits of incidental search. 27 The inherent vagueness of
the standard presented a serious threat to the right of privacy protected
by the fourth amendment, because the scope of the search was not subject
to judicial restraint prior to the action, but was determined by what
seemed reasonable to the arresting officer at the time of arrest. 28

The

inevitable result of such a determination was that the police concept of
reasonableness tended to dominate and control since all searches were
not judicially examined as they would have been had the police been
required to obtain a warrant. In some instances police concepts of reasonableness also prevailed because once the police had made an arrest and
obtained the evidence, their very success tended to have a retroactive effect
29
on probable cause and thus influence the judicial finding of such cause.
The dissent in the instant case attempts to justify the reasonableness approach by the application of two principles: first, since the police
may justifiably search the area within the arrestee's control for weapons
or evidence, a further invasion of his privacy by searching in a broader
area is relatively minor ,80 and second, it would not be unreasonable to
dispense with the need for a warrant, since the arrestee could immediately
31
seek judicial determination of probable cause in an adversary proceeding.
In considering these arguments, the majority feels itself unable in light
of fourth amendment principles to characterize the invasion of privacy
which results from an extensive search of a man's home as being minor.
The protection of prior judicial screening, it contends, is being sacrificed
for no apparent reason, at least in so far as it would be practical to obtain
a warrant. Secondly, the majority questions whether the states do in
fact provide the speedy proceedings to determine probable cause which
the dissent assumes. But even more fundamentally, the fourth amendment
would not be served by merely preventing the introduction of evidence
illegally seized.3 2 Subsequent review is never an adequate substitute for
27. "To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criteria of
reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to
say that an 'unreasonable search' is forbidden - that the search must be reasonable."
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
28. Given this leeway, it is not surprising to find police engaging in somewhat
questionable practices such as waiting for a suspect to enter his home before arresting
him so that they can conduct an extensive search of his home. Petitioner accused
the police of this very thing in Chimel. Another practice is to arrest a suspect on a
trumped-up charge such as vagrancy or speeding and then carry out an otherwise
invalid search as an incident to that arrest. See Worthy v. United States, 409 F.2d
1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29. See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J.
319; Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261;
The Supreme Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARV. L. Rxv. 114 (1950).
30. 395 U.S. at 774 (1969).
31. Id. at 780. This theory was first espoused by Mr. Justice Brennan in his
dissenting opinion in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 249-50 (1960).
32. Previously, the only protection afforded an individual from the unlawful invasion of police officers was the exclusion from evidence at the trial of any evidence
which had been illegally obtained. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
applies the exclusionary rule to federal courts. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
applies this rule to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
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prior screening. The right of the individual to be secure in his home
would not be protected by a later finding that the evidence sought to be
introduced was obtained by illegal means.
The Supreme Court's increased emphasis on the warrant system is
in line with the underlying rationale of current fourth amendment cases
dealing with the general area of search and seizure. In each decision the
warrant procedure has been vigorously applied. In Terry v. Ohio,88 a
case on which the Chimel majority heavily relied, the Court emphasized
that, whenever practical, the police must obtain advance judicial approval
for conducting searches and seizures. In Katz v. United States,8 4 evidence
obtained by electronic surveillance was held inadmissible because it was
not obtained through a warrant which the Court felt was a necessary precondition for eavesdropping. And Camara v. Municipal Court3 5 ruled
that in certain types of administrative searches, warrants would be required
prior to the governmental inspection unless consent was obtained from the
owner of the premises.
The effect of these cases and particularly the instant decision on
the warrant system will undoubtedly involve substantial costs to society.
Police and magistrates will be required to do a great deal of time-consuming paper work as a necessary incident to the operation of the warrant
system. At the same time, studies of the warrant system " indicate that,
if not issued under ideal conditions, the protection afforded by warrants
is less than that insured by responsible and restrained law enforcement
techniques. However, in spite of this increased burden on the warrant
system and its possible weaknesses, the Supreme Court has now decided
that prior judicial screening is so essential to fourth amendment principles
that it regards these practical factors as less significant than the preservation of individual freedom from unreasonable intrusions by law enforcement officials.
The permissible scope of an incidental search under the new rule is
based on the Terry case; the same rationale87 which governs the scope
of "stop and frisk" underlies the basis of a "search incident to a lawful
arrest" and marks its proper extent. But it is important to remember
that the limited search permitted by Terry may only be used when its
sole justification applies - protection of the police officer in this brief
face to face encounter.38 Thus, the "frisk" must be limited to a "patting33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Other cases emphasizing the importance of the warrant
procedure are Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964) ; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
36. J.LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 194 (1966);
L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 115, 201 (1967);
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTo CUSTODY 15-16, 502-04

(1965).
37. In Terry, the Court held that, "the scope of [a] search must be strictly 'tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 392
U.S. at 20 (1968).
38. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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down"39 of the outer clothing of the suspect for weapons which would
be readily accessible and could be used without considerable delay. 40 In
contrast, the on-the-scene search of an arrestee's person must be more
extensive because the suspect is vsually in the presence of the officers for
a longer period and may well have an opportunity to procure a carefully
concealed weapon. Moreover, a search incident to the arrest of a suspect
does not rely solely on protection of the officer as its justification, but is
equally justified by the need to prevent the destruction or concealment
of evidence. This, by itself, would require a more extensive search than
a "frisk" prescribes.
If evidence of some other crime is discovered during the course of
a valid search, the guidelines established by the instant decision do not
appear to disturb the traditional rule which allows the admission of such
evidence. 41 The Court in Chimel expressly states that "it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's person .... ,41. This approach seems to be sound. Since
probable cause must exist for an arrest to be valid, there is usually a
sufficient nexus between the individual and the offense to justify a belief
that he may have on his person either a weapon or other evidence of the
crime. Under these circumstances, an accompanying search which is
limited in scope to the justifiable objectives of incidental search - protection of the officer and preventing the destruction of evidence - would be
43
valid and any discovered evidence should be admissible.
In the past, the Supreme Court has justified a search of the "place"
44
where the arrest occurs by an application of the objectives outlined above.
As a practical matter, however, the lower courts have given little more
than lip service to these objectives. They have generally upheld any search,
regardless of extent, that was in any way "incident" to a lawful arrest. 45
39. The standard police instructions on how to search a person provide:
[Tihe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's
body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and the area about the testicles, and entire surface of the
legs down to the feet.
L. Priar & T. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
481 (1954).
40. 392 U.S. at 65. For discussions of the scope of "stop and frisk," see LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REv. 40 (1968); Comment, Stop and Frisk, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 837 (1969);
7 DuQ. L. Rtv. 144 (1968) ; 20 SYRACUSn L. Rxv. 85 (1968).
41. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (seizure of contraband incident
to an arrest unrelated to the presence of the contraband was admissible); Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960) (fruits and instrumentalities of any crime
are admissible if they come into the officer's possession during a lawful search).
42. 395 U.S. at 763 (1969).
43. This basis for justifying an incidental search had been disregarded in a
recent pre-Chimel case, United States v. Worthy, 409 F.2d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
which held that narcotics seized as the result of an extensive search of a man arrested
for vagrancy were admissible as being incident to his arrest. This type of ruling would
now clearly violate the permissible scope of a search established by the instant case.
44. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) ; Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
45. See note 26 supra.
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The Court has expressed its concern for the ever-increasing scope of
contemporaneous searches by showing a tendency in recent cases to limit
them. In Preston v. United States, 46 an incidental search was held to
be invalid because it was not justified by the need to seize weapons or
prevent the destruction -f evidence and was too remote in time and place.
And in Peters v. New York, 47 the search was sustained only because it
was limited in scope to the objectives outlined in Preston. The instant
case goes further and not only restricts the scope of search to the enumerated objectives, but confines the area which may be searched strictly to
the room in which the arrest was made, and does not allow probing into
any closed or concealed areas of that room itself; thus, seizures are strictly
confined to visible and readily accessible items.
In conjunction with this, however, it might well be argued that
limiting the scope of incidental search by a fixed formula might create
more problems than it purports to solve. If the scope of reasonable search
is to be limited to the room where the arrest occurred, how large may the
circumference of the room be? What of hallways and corridors leading to
larger rooms? How do you define the areas within a suspect's "reach" ?48
In trying to answer these questions it would be well to remember that,
under the Chimel rule, the permissible scope of the search will not be
judged by a geographizal formula alone, but the search will be weighed
in light of the legitimate objectives established by the sound application
of fourth amendment principles.
Additionally, in those situations 49 where it would be impractical to
obtain a search warrant because the purpose of the search would be frustrated by requiring one, Chimel would still allow a warrantless, incidental
search extending beyond the room where the arrest occurred. 50 Here,
too, the scope of the search should be no broader than could be justified
by the application of the reason for dispensing with the warrant requirement. Just such an approach was used in Schmerber v. California51 to
justify the immediate taking of a blood sample from a man accused of
drunken driving. Since the only reason for taking the blood before leaving the scene was that delay would make the evidence unobtainable, the
scope of the search was limited to only those tests which had to be made
immediately. Similarly, in Warden v. Hayden,52 the Court assumed,
without holding, that the scope of a search in "hot pursuit" should be
limited to finding the suspect or weapons he might use to escape and not
46.
47.
48.
49.

376 U.S. 364 (1964).
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Respondent's Brief at 64, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
See note 19 supra.

50. Mr. Justice Stewart expressly points out that the holding in Chimel is entirely
consistent with the existing principle that, assuming probable cause, moving vehicles
may be searched without a warrant where it isn't practical to obtain one because the
vehicle may be moved out of the area where the arrest occurs. See Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
51. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
52. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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to find evidence of his guilt, even though seizable if found. This procedure of examining the reason behind allowing warrantless searches
and limiting their scope to that reason is in line with the underlying
rationale in Chimel and should provide the criteria for judging all incidental searches involving the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Although it is generally agreed that law enforcement requires some
degree of incidental search at the time of arrest,53 there appears to be
no constitutionally justifiable excuse for the broad scope of incidental
search which has existed since Harris and Rabinowitz. Prior to the rule
in the principal case, law enforcement officers have had to use their own
judgment in determining what constitutes the reasonable scope of such
searches. The very permissiveness of this procedure induced police to
engage in warrantless searches with much frequency - often with no
justification. Hopefully, the application of the rules and principles adopted
in Chimel will eliminate the problem of determining by a retrospective examination the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest and
substantially reduce the amount of unconstitutional invasions of privacy.
Timothy E. Foley

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRISONERS
WHO ENTER GUILTY PLEAS ARE NOT FORECLOSED FROM HAVING
A FEDERAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF
THEIR PLEA.

Ross v. McMann (2d Cir. 1969)
Dash v. Follette (2d Cir. 1969)
In separate criminal proceedings, petitioners Ross and Dash were

convicted after pleading guilty to charges of murder and robbery respectively. The state courts denied their petitions for writs of error
coram nobis.1 The petitioners subsequently applied to federal district
courts for writs of habeas corpus claiming that their guilty pleas resulted
from the threatened use by the prosecution of coerced confessions which
53. See generally R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (1964); J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT (1966); L. TIFFANY,
D. MCINTYRe & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (1967).

See also Way, Increas-

ing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261; Note, Scope
Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969).
1. People v. Ross, 26 App. Div. 2d 773, 272 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
People v. Dash, 21 App. Div. 2d 978, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 937 (1965). Coram nobis is a common law writ, the purpose of which is
to correct a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered on the ground of
error of fact. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1785-86 (4th ed. 1951).
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would have led to their conviction. 2 The district courts dismissed the
petitions without a hearing relying on the Glenn v. McMann3 rationale
that "[a] voluntary guilty plea entered on advice of counsel is a waiver
of all non-jurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings
.

. .,"'

thereby invalidating their coerced confession claim.

The Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a six to three decision, reversed
and remanded 5 with instructions to hear and determine petitioners' applications, holding that the petitions raised sufficient question as to the
voluntariness of the pleas of guilty to require hearings thereon., Ross
v. MeMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969); Dash v. Follette, 409 F.2d
1016 (2d Cir. 1969).
From a historical viewpoint, it is important to note that the availability of federal habeas corpus proceedings for state court prisoners7
has long been one of the most controversial areas in criminal law.
Although habeas corpus was incorporated by the Constitution as a federal
common law remedy,8 it was not until 1867 that Congress authorized
a federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a state in
violation of his Constitutional rights.9 Since then the statutory language
governing the scope of the writ has not been altered to any significant
extent, 10 but the interpretation of the language has materially changed.
For example, at first the use of the writ in federal courts to test the
constitutional validity of a conviction was restricted to those cases where
the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction within the trial court."
2. Ross applied for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Dash made his application for writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Specifically, petitioner Ross
alleged that he pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree because his attorney
had refused to attempt to suppress an illegally obtained confession, and had warned
him that if he risked trial, confession and other evidence would surely lead to his
conviction for first degree murder and sentence to the electric chair. Alleging similar
grounds, petitioner Dash claimed that his plea of guilty to the charge of robbery
in the second degree was the product of a coerced confession and that the trial court
warned him that he would get the maximum penalty if found guilty after trial.
3. 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965).
4. Id. at 1019.
5. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969). It was noted that petitioner's habeas petitions may be premature in that state court remedies may still be
available. If this is determined by the District Court to be the case, that court may
defer hearing on this matter pending final determination of the action in the state courts.
6. Both convictions would stand, of course, if it were determined after a full
and fair evidentiary hearing, either that the confession was voluntary and there was
no threat by the judge or attorney, or that the plea was not substantially motivated
by the confession or by the alleged threat of the judge or attorney. Ross v. McMann,
409 F.2d at 1023 n.4.
7. See Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners,23 WASH.
& Lvt L. REv. 23 (1966).
2. This clause provides: "The privilege of the
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl.
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it."
9. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
10. See Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended,
13 F.R.D. 407 (1953).
11. However, while still speaking in terms of lack of jurisdiction upon the part
of the state court, the federal courts were continuously stretching federal habeas
corpus to include review of state court proceedings which were jurisdictionally correct.
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However, since 1942,12 habeas corpus relief for state prisoners in federal
courts has been steadily broadened by the expanded application of the
concept of procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. In
1963, in an effort to clarify certain federal standards for dealing with
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court decided the famous trilogy of Fay
v. Noia,'8 Townsend v. Sain14 and Sanders v. United States.15 Of these
cases' 6 it is the Townsend decision which is particularly applicable in
determining whether the federal court should hold an evidentiary hearing
on issues previously tried and decided in the state courts. In Townsend,
the petitioner moved to suppress a confession he had made on the grounds
that it had been induced by drugs. The state conceded that he had
been given the injection, but after a hearing in which there was conflicting testimony as to the drug's effect, the trial judge denied the
motion without explanation, and Townsend was convicted. 1 7 Due to
the unresolved factual issues involved in the admissibility of the confession, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded.18 In
reaching its decision to order a hearing, the Court established liberal
guidelines to be followed in deciding when a hearing is proper in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas corpus applicant did
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court,
either at the time of trial or in a collateral proceeding. 19
The Court felt that these standards would help clarify certain controversial
aspects of federal habeas corpus petitions.
The precise issue before the Court of Appeals in the instant cases
was whether either petitioner had raised sufficient question as to the
voluntariness of his guilty plea to require an evidentiary hearing thereon.
Although the guilty pleas were entered on the advice of their respective
counsel, the petitioners claimed that the threatened use of illegally obtained confessions coerced them into pleading guilty and therefore such
pleas were not voluntary. However, in order to entertain this argument
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
12. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
13. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Court held that the prisoner need not exhaust state
remedies that are not available to the prisoner at the time he files his petition.
14. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
15. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). The Court removed the principle of res judicata as a
consideration in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
16. These three cases when considered with the procedural aspects of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1964), constitute the guidelines for applying the present
law of federal habeas cornus.
17. His conviction was affirmed by the state appellate court, People v. Townsend,
11 111. 2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 850 (1957), and collateral
state relief was denied without an evidentiary hearing. The district court judge,
considering only the pleadings filed in Townsend's federal habeas application and the
opinion of the state appellate court on appeal, denied the writ.
18. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
19. Id. at 312.
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and remand the cases for evidentiary hearings, the appellate court had
to overcome the rule enunciated in Glenn v. McMann,20 where it was
held that "[a] voluntary guilty plea entered on advice of counsel is a
waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings . . .,,21 Realizing that the rule on its face would bar an
evidentiary hearing by the federal court and thereby prejudice defendant's
procedural rights,22 the court attempts to circumvent this dilemma by
distinguishing between two possible interpretations of the holding in
Glenn and adhering to the narrowest reading.
A broad reading of Glenn would dictate the conclusion that an
unconstitutionally coerced confession would be irrelevant in determining
the voluntariness of the guilty plea. 28 While the majority agrees that
prior violations of constitutional rights are waived by a voluntary guilty
plea, it determines that the holding in Glenn was more limited. The
court interprets Glenn to read that "the allegation of a coerced confession,
without more, is not sufficient to raise the issue of the voluntariness
' 24
of a guilty plea."
In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals has established
the rule that mere conclusory allegations by a petitioner that his confession was coerced are not sufficient to predicate an order for a hearing
on the issue of voluntariness - it is mandatory that sufficient particulars
be alleged.28 In other words, through a narrow reading 26 of Glenn
20. 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965). In Glenn, petitioner was convicted of murder
pursuant to his plea of guilty given in open court while he was represented by counsel.
He applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his plea of guilty was unconstitutionally coerced by the existence of a confession that had been obtained from
him involuntarily.
21. Id. at 1019.
22. An anomoly is presented if the Glenn rule is followed in that a defendant
who pleaded guilty for fear of being convicted for either a higher crime or a longer
sentence due to the existence of a coerced confession or other illegally obtained
evidence could not have his conviction reviewed either by appeal or in a habeas corpus
proceeding whereas if a defendant pleaded not guilty and was later convicted through
the use of a coerced confession or illegally obtained evidence, he could appeal his
conviction and obtain a reversal upon proof of his allegations.
23. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d at 1020.
24. Id. at 1019-20.
25. In explaining what particulars must be alleged the court states:
To enable the district court to decide whether or not a hearing should be
ordered, additional supportinr material such as the affidavit of the attorney who
represented the petitioner when he entered the guilty plea, or exhibits or affidavits
of persons having knowledge of the claimed facts, should be appended, with the
petitioner's own affidavit, to the original petition filed with the district court.
Id. at 1022 n.3.
26. The court finds support for its narrow interpretation of Glenn in recent
Second Circuit cases which have implied that a prior invasion of a defendant's constitutional rights is relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the guilty plea. See
United States ex rel. Boucher v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977, 981 (2d Cir. 1965), where,
in determining that petitioner's guilty plea had been voluntary, the court found that
he had been adequately represented by counsel at his arraignment; United States
ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 261 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
869 (1965), where in affirming a conviction based on the constitutional validity of a
statute, the court stated that there was no reliance on the suggestion that a plea of
guilty should bar collateral attack on prior constitutional defects; United States ex rel.
Martin v. Fay, 352 F.2d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion), cert. denied,
384. U.S. 957 (1966), where the court stated that it could "conceive of situations in
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the court has determined that when sufficient doubt as to the voluntariness
of the guilty plea has been raised, prior constitutional defects are
relevant in resolving that issue.
This problem of whether a particular guilty plea is an effective
waiver of all prior non-jurisdictional defects is of great concern to

the courts. 2 7

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals finds that the

guilty pleas were not voluntary and therefore could not be considered
as waivers of prior invasions of constitutional rights. In applying the
established standards of waiver, 28 the court finds that in light of the
allegations set forth in the petitions neither of the guilty pleas were an
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," 29 and therefore neither could serve as a voluntary waiver.3 0
Although in particular cases other circuit courts have affirmed the
right of state prisoners to apply for federal habeas corpus to question
the voluntariness of their guilty pleas,8 ' the Second Circuit, through the
holding in the instant case, is the first to establish a definite rule to be
applied in determining whether to hold a hearing on the issue of volunwhich a plea of guilty upon the advice of counsel would have been caused by circumstances entitling the defendant to challenge his own act on the ground it was
a compelled act"; United States ex rel. Siebold v. Reincke, 362 F.2d 592, 593 (2d Cir.
1966), where it was noted that "[a] conviction will not be sustained if it rests upon
a plea of guilty which is the result of coercion, nor, perhaps, if a plea of guilty resulted
from other violations of constitutional rights."
27. Voluntariness is important because the guilty plea serves as a conviction. As
noted in Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962), the gravity of a plea of
guilty makes it mandatory that the surrounding circumstances be conscientiously
examined in order to verify the propriety of the proceedings.
28. The Supreme Court in Pay clearly stated that no matter what the state procedural method might be, any forfeiture of constitutional rights must meet the federal
standards of waiver. 372 U.S. at 420-22.
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). This is the classic definition
of waiver used by the federal courts.
30. The court further substantiates its contention that petitioners did not voluntarily relinquish their right to contest the coerced confessions by pointing out that
the state failed to afford a constitutionally acceptable means of presenting their claims.
In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the only state procedure for contesting
the validity of confessions was declared retroactively unconstitutional.
In Jackson the trial court had submitted the issue of the voluntariness of
petitioner's confession to the jury, instructing it to ignore the confession if it felt
that it was involuntary; and then to determine guilt from the other evidence in the
case. Alternatively, if the confession was found to be voluntary, the jury was instructed to determine its truth and reliability and to weigh it accordingly. On appeal
from a denial of Jackson's writ in federal district court, the Supreme Court held that
the New York procedure did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness
of the confession and violated the petitioner's constitutional rights under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
It should be noted that in the dissenting opinion of the instant case, Chief
Judge Lumbard disagrees with the majority's application of Jackson. He asserts
that since Jackson dealt with confessions which actually went before a jury for consideration, it is inconsequential whether petitioners were deterred from having the
jury rule on their confessions. The inference being that it is pure speculation to
consider whether they pleaded guilty because they did not want a jury to know of
their "confession." At the time of their trials, before Jackson, defendants Ross and
Dash did, according to the dissent, have an acceptable procedure by which they could
present their claims. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016, 1029 (1969).
31. See United States ex rel. Collins v. Maroney, 382 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1967);
Broxon v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Reed v. Henderson, 385 F.2d
995 (6th Cir. 1967); Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1966); Shelton v.
United States, 292 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 877 (1962).
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tariness. By formulating specific standards as to what must be alleged,
the court indicates that it is striving for complete protection of individual
rights when accepting a guilty plea.82 However, there is disagreement
between the state and federal courts as to the effective use of habeas
corpus to achieve this preservation of constitutional rights. Of great
concern is the relative ease with which cases settled on pleas of guilty
can be attacked. 88 As stated in the dissent:
If a defendant's decision to plead guilty can be attacked and placed
in jeopardy many years later, the state will have been deprived of
a substantial part of the benefit which it properly and fairly thought
it should enjoy - namely, achieving a8 4sure and certain result and
saving considerable time and expense.
Notwithstanding this justifiable state interest in finality, the federal
courts are primarily concerned with whether the state procedures leading to the entry of the guilty plea were fundamentally fair in a
constitutional sense.85
Aside from this controversy over the effect of a guilty plea, the
decisions in Ross and Dash touch upon the more basic question of to
what extent state court proceedings are reviewable by federal courts.
There is strong feeling among many legal commentators 6 that the federal
courts are encouraging a flood of petitions by adopting the liberal guidelines of Townsend. This claim is supported by the upward trend of
recent years in the number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state
prisoners.3 7 This increase in volume gives rise to the state's objection
concerning the cost of additional proceedings. The habeas corpus jurisdiction does require an enormous commitment of federal judicial resources, to say nothing of the heavy burdens it imposes on state prosecuting authorities, for what has been suggested to be a marginal profit
in terms of furthering criminal justice.38 However, if the continued
restraint of a single defendant in violation of his constitutional rights
is intolerable as the Court in Fay said it was,3 9 then habeas corpus needs
no cost justification.
32. See note 27 supra.

33. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016, 1030 n.1 (1969).
34. Id. at 1030.
35. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963), the Court stated that
"[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty
is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."
36. See Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 945 (1964);
Carter, The Use of Federal Habeas Corpus by State Prisoners, 23 WASH. & L z

L. RZv. 23 (1966) ; Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D.

313 (1947) ; Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45

F.R.D. 45 (1968) ; Comment, The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From
State Prisoners,52 VA. L. Rzv. 486 (1966).
37. From only 1,903 in 1963, the number of petitions has increased to 6,331 in
1968. DIRCTOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE O THI U.S. CouRTs ANN. Rzs. 130 (1968).
38. See Comment The Burden of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions From State
v.486 (1966).
Prisoners,52 VA. L.
39. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963).
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A more impressive argument is that the petitioner who may have
a valid constitutional claim has little chance for the federal court to
evaluate it in sifting through the thousands of meritless petitions. As
Mr. Justice Jackson noted in Brown v. Allen, 40 the federal courts' task
is extremely difficult:
[T]his Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ
until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the
docket of the lower courts and swell our own. Judged by our
own disposition of habeas corpus matters, they have, as a class, become peculiarly undeserving. It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless one. He who
must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the
41
attitude that the needle is not worth the search.
This view is supported by the dissent in the instant cases, which feels
it is not the function of federal courts to review state criminal proceedings in order to determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea entered
years before. The traditional opposing argument to this line of reasoning
was succinctly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is
the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher
42
duty than to maintain it unimpaired.
As noted by the majority, when a petitioner alleges facts sufficient to
support his claim that his guilty plea was substantially induced by the
existence of a confession illegally obtained from him which he had no
adequate means of challenging, it is the duty of the court to grant him
a hearing.
Other Justices who agree with Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' proposition - that the protection of individual constitutional rights is of utmost
importance in our judicial system - emphasize the significance of the
growing protections that the interpretation of the Constitution affords
to state prisoners. 48 In light of this, the federal courts have been
indicating that if the state remedy is inadequate, or the possibility of
state relief uncertain, the state prisoner may apply to federal court for
a writ of habeas corpus.4 4 Although the federal courts recognize that
this growing trend to liberally grant review of state proceedings is
40. 344 U.S. 443, 532 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 536-37.
42. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1938).
43. The Supreme Court has been gradually expanding the scope of the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment, thereby increasing the number of grounds upon
which violation of constitutional rights may be based. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
44. See, e.g., Bruce v. Beto, 396 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Whippler v. Balkcom,
342 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Brown v. Heyd, 277 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. La. 1967).
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subject to great criticism, 45 this controversy over the balance of power
between state and federal courts is far from settled. Only when the
states have fully recognized the necessity of assuring a completely fair
administration of criminal justice will intervention by the federal courts
46
wither away.
It is submitted that the court's analysis in Ross and Dash indicates
that, despite the repeated warnings that our courts are becoming congested with meritless petitions and that there is too much emphasis on
the procedural protection of constitutional rights, the federal courts will
continue to safeguard individual freedom by protecting the right to
petition for writ of habeas corpus. By ordering hearings to determine
the voluntariness of guilty pleas, the court is recognizing that for the
state prisoner with a meritorious claim the consequences - death or
imprisonment - are too harsh to allow the courts to limit the power
of habeas corpus.
Michael P. Kane
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Shingleton v. Bussey (Fla. 1969)
Plaintiff Bussey brought an action against defendant Shingleton and
her insurer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., for damages sustained
as a result of defendant's alleged negligence in operating an automobile.
The Circuit Court for Leon County, Florida, dismissed the insurance
company as a party, and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the District Court
of Appeals, First District, determined that the trial court erred in the
dismissal, and the cause was reversed and remanded.' The insurance
company appealed this judgment, and the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the district court's decision, holding, inter alia, that the injured
plaintiff was a third party beneficiary of the motor vehicle liability policy,
and as such, he had a right to direct action against the insurer which
45. In Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), it was stated that "[t]he Court
is not blind to the fact that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been a source
of irritation between the federal and state judiciaries." Id. at 453.
46. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1022 (1965).

1. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1968).
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could not be deferred by a no action clause2 in the insurance contract.
Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
Traditionally, an injured third party has had no right of direct
action against an insurer as a third party beneficiary to an insurance
contract.8 This rule has been in effect in Florida since the 1936 case of
Artille v. Davidson,4 which held that an insurer could not be joined as
a party to an action between the injured party and the insured because
the action sounded in contract and the plaintiff could not show privity
between himself and either of the parties to the contract." The Artille
court further held that the insurance contract was not entered into
for the benefit of plaintiff as a member of the public, and therefore,
plaintiff could not join the insurer directly under a third party beneficiary
theory. 6 While, absent a statute, this is still the law in a majority of
jurisdictions, in recent years some states have accepted the third party
7
beneficiary rationale.
As a result of the rule that injured parties do not have a right
of direct action against insurance companies, no action clauses obligating
the insurer to indemnify the insured only for losses actually sustained
and paid by the insured8 have been consistently upheld as not against
public policy. 9 Likewise, no action clauses conditioning the insurance
2. A no action clause provides that no action will lie against insurer until the
amount of assured's obligation is ascertained by judgment or by settlement. E.g.,
C.C.H. Auto. L. Rep. f 2370, at 2035.
3. See 8 J.A. APPLIMAN & J. APPLgMAN, INSURANcz LAW AND PCrcCZ §§
4851-61 (2d ed. 1962).
4. 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936).
5. Id. at 221-22, 170 So. at 708. See also Russell v. Burroughs, 183 Ga. 361,

188 S.E. 451 (1936) ; Ellis v. Bruce, 215 Iowa 308, 245 N.W. 320 (1932)
Zeigler v.
Ryan, 63 S.D. 607, 262 N.W. 200 (1935) ; Conwell v. Hays, 103 W. Va 69 136 S.E.
604 (1927) ; Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant,
22 MARQ. L. Rv. 75, 76 (1938).
6. 126 Fla. 219, 222, 170 So. 707, 708 (1936). Exceptions to this kind of holding
have taken place where the insurance contract in controversy expressly stipulated
that it was entered for the benefit of injured third parties. See, e.g., McCaleb v.
Continental Cas. Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W.2d 679 (1938). However, most of the
cases before the courts have involved indemnity policies, i.e., liability contracts made
for the sole benefit of the assured. See, e.g., Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 F. 881
(3d Cir. 1906); Shea v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 98 Conn. 453, 120 A.
286 (1923) ; Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266, 72 N.E. 981 (1905).
7. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943) (applying
Michigan law) ; Slavens v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1928)
(applying Montana law) ; Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d
12 (1965) ; American Auto Ins. Co. v. Struwe, 218 S.W. 534 (Tex. 1920).
8. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Beckworth, 74 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1934).
9. See, e.g., Davison v. Maryland Cas. Co., 197 Mass. 167, 83 N.E. 407 (1908);
Connolly v. Bolster, 187 Mass. 266, 72 N.E. 981 (1905). Under such policies, injured
third parties who were awarded judgments against insolvent insureds could not
recover from the insurer because the condition precedent to insurer's liability, loss
paid by insured, had not been met. Thatcher v. Aetna Accident and Liab. Co., 287
F. 484 (8th Cir. 1923); Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co 145 F. 881 (3d Cir. 1906);
Bain v. Atkins, 181 Mass. 240, 63 N.E. 414 (1902) ; Comment, 13 LA. L. Rlv. 495,
496-97 (1953). In the face of these inequities many states, recognizing the social
utility of direct suit against insurance companies as a means of distributing the burden
of caring for injured parties, enacted remedial legislation making insurers liable in
spite of assured's insolvency and allowing injured parties to sue insurer directly
after obtaining judgment against insured. See, e.g., ARIC. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-526,
66-527 (1947) ; CAL. INs. CoDX § 11580 (West 1955) ; LA. AcT. 253 of 1918; MASS.
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259

company's liability on ascertainment of the insured's obligation' ° have
been held valid and enforceable." Some states have adopted direct
action statutes, 12 thereby allowing injured third parties a right of direct
suit against the insurer. The purpose of these statutes was to reduce
the occurrence of piecemeal litigation by allowing disclosure of insurance
company interests in suits by injured parties against insureds. However,
no court has allowed direct suit absent such a statute."3
In the instant case the Florida supreme court has become the first
court to rely on a third party beneficiary theory to permit direct action
where there is a no action clause in the insurance contract. In reaching
this conclusion the court first establishes that a direct right of action
accrued to the injured third party absent such a clause. The court relies
heavily on the nature of automobile liability insurance and on the Florida
14
public policy evidenced by the state's Financial Responsibility Law,
to show that the plaintiff was a member of the endangered public and,
as such, was the intended direct beneficiary of the insurance contract.
The court argues that liability contracts are entered into for the direct
benefit of the public at large and therefore its injured members are
the intended beneficiaries of the contract and should be allowed direct suit
against both contracting parties. Both the nature of insurance contracts
themselves and the functions they serve appear to substantiate the court's
reasoning. When one enters an automobile liability insurance contract,
he does so contemplating the possibility of injury to third parties resulting
from his negligence. 15 Although it can be argued that the primary
parties to the agreement enter it for the sole purpose of protecting the
Ch. 175, §§ 112, 113 (1959); N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 167-I(a), (b)
(McKinney 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 27-7-1, 27-7-2 (1956); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 85.93, 260.11 (1957). There were many more such remedial statutes. Cf.
Comment, 9 OREGON L. Rxv. 57 (1930); Note, 46 HARV. L. Rzv. 1325 (1933); Note,
15 IOWA L. R'v. 73 (1930). Such statutes were held constitutional in Merchants
Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925).
GEN. LAWS ANN.

10. See Faude, The New Standard Automobile Policy, 1955 INS. L.J. 647; C.C.H.
Auto. L. Rep. 2370, at 2035.
11. See, e.g., Michel v. Fire & Cas. Co., 82 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Government
Personnel Auto. Ass'n v. Haag, 131 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
12. Under such statutes injured parties may sue insurers directly in spite of a
no action clause in the contract. Arkansas permits original suit against insurers of
charities which would not be otherwise liable. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-517 (Supp.
1959). Louisiana permits the direct action against all liability insurers. LA. RZv.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959).
The Rhode Island statute permits direct suit on all
liability policies written locally. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2 (1956); Riding v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 433, 138 A. 186 (1927). The Wisconsin statute is similar
to that of Louisiana. WIs. STAT. §§ 204.30(1), 260.11(1) (1959).
13. Other states, having instituted compulsory insurance for common carriers,
judicially sanction such direct action on the theory that insurance is for the benefit of
the public and the compulsory insurance rules evidence a legislative design to confer
the right on injured persons. See, e.g., Jones v. Thunderbird Transp. Co., 178 F.
Supp. 9 (D. Kan. 1959); James v. Young, 77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d 692 (1950);
Enders v. Longmire, 179 Okla. 633, 67 P.2d 12 (1937). However, this is as far as
the judiciary has gone along this line.
14. 13 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 (1968).
15. Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12 (1965) ; Simmon
v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill. 2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954); American Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Struwe, 218 S.W. 534 (Tex. 1920).
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insured against liability for his own wrongdoing,'0 the fact that the
parties contemplate an accident indicates that injured third parties possess
more than an incidental interest in the contract. 1 7 The high number of
suits involving automobile liability insurance' 8 is a further illustration
of the importance to the public of liability insurance. Indeed, the courts
have recognized that "[]any persons injured and disabled from automobile accidents would become public charges . . ."19 if not for liability
insurance. 20 Thus, since it appears that such contracts are at least
partially for the direct benefit of the public and can no longer be considered merely the private contract of two parties, there appears to be
no valid reason to consider injured third parties as mere incidental
beneficiaries to the insurance contract.
The public nature of automobile liability insurance has led Florida
and other states to adopt various public policies for the purpose of
providing security for persons injured in automobile accidents. 21 Ready
evidence of this policy in Florida is available in the preamble to the
state's Financial Responsibility Law:
It is the intent of this chapter to . . . provide financial security
by such owners and operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property caused by the operation
of a motor vehicle .... 2
The statute implements this public policy by requiring proof of ability
to pay future obligations, defining minimum required insurance, and
23
supplying required provisions for automobile liability insurance contracts.
This enactment would seem to implicitly recognize the public nature of
automobile liability insurance and indicate an intent that injured parties
be able to recover through a direct suit against the insurer.
16. Goodwillie v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 108 Wis. 207, 84 N.W. 164

(1900) ; Appleman, supra note 5.
17. Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12 (1965) ; Simmon
v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 Ill. 2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509 (1954).
18. Appleman, supra note 5, at 75; Sinha, The Problem of Application of the
Fault Principle to Automobile Accidents, 14 VILL. L. REv. 386, 402-03 (1969). Eightyfive percent of American automobile owners carry liability insurance. CONARD, MORGAN,
PRATT, VOLTZ & BOMBAUGrH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS 90 (1964).
19. Simmon v. Iowa Mut. Cas. Co., 3 I11.2d 318, 121 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1954).
20. Studies have shown that a high percentage of victims relying on uninsured
operators for recovery receive no compensation; whereas from 80 to 85 percent of those
dependant on insured motorists for compensation receive some recovery. CoMMiTTrE

TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCENCES 204 (1932) ; James &

Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little Too Late, 26
CONN. B.J. 70, 75 (1952).
21. Almost all states have enacted compulsory insurance laws regarding commercial vehicles. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.574 (1937) ; See Brownfield, Compulsory Liability Insurance for Commercial Motor Vehicles, 3 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROD. 571 (1936).
Most states have adopted financial responsibility legislation.

E.g., 13 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 (1968) ; See Braun, The FinancialResponsibility Law,

3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (1936).

Other states have statutes providing for

compulsory uninsured motorist coverage. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15
(1957) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1968).

22. 13 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.011 (1968); Comment, Substantive Due Process

in Florida,21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 99, 124 (1966).
23. 13 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 324.011, 324.021, 324.051 (1968).
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Furthermore, denial of direct action tends to produce results which
appear repugnant to this statutory intent. The resultant delay in recovery may cause increased financial difficulties to the injured party
because of discontinued income and unpaid medical expenses, 24 or it
may force him to delay in obtaining proper medical attention. 25 Likewise,
the victim may be forced to accept a quick, inadequate legal settlement
with the insurer in order to avoid the financial pressure and the anxiety
of further litigation.2 6 Thus, the policy of securing recompense for
injured parties would appear to be more adequately implemented by
allowing them to sue the insurer directly.
The principle argument against giving effect to the legislative intent
and for denying protection to the injured third party is that knowledge
regarding the tortfeasors' insurance coverage will cause juries to grant
more and larger judgments to injured parties.2 7 It is contended that
juries will unfairly evaluate testimony if they know that defendant 2is8
an affluent insurance company, rather than a person of meager means.
Although this argument has been accepted by a majority of jurisdictions, 29
close analysis indicates that it is not a valid reason for denying direct
action. The prejudice allegedly engendered against an insurer as a result
of the jury's knowledge of insurance coverage would appear to be
minimal since modern jurors are familiar with automobile liability
insurance80 and probably assume that an insurance company is the
ultimate defendant even though its role is anonymous. 8 ' Similarly, if
such prejudice exists, it appears that it would not be increased by permitting direct suit, since coverage is often revealed at trial in order to
24. Sinha, supra note 18, at 408.

25. See CONARD, MORGAN, PRMT, VOLTZ & BOMBAUGH, supra note 18, at 221;
Conard & Jacobs, New Hope for Consensus in the Automobile Injury Impasse, 52
A.B.A.J. 533, 537 (1966) ; Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law:
A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 3
(1961); McNiece & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensation,
27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 585, 590 (1952) ; Sinha, supra note 18, at 408 n.162.
26. Ehrenzweig, 'Full-Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim - A Voluntary
Compensation Plan, 43 CALI. L. Rv. 1, 7-8 (1955); Franklin, Chanin & Mark,

supra note 25, at 3; McNiece & Thornton, supra note 25, at 590; Sinha, supra note 18,

at 408 n.162.
27. See generally 8 J.A. APPLEMAN. & J. APPLIMAN, supra note 3, § 4861, at
294-95; Comment, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law
Problems, 74 HARV. L. Rsv. 357, 358 (1960).
28. Appleman, supra note 5, at 81; Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party
in Interest, 41 MINN. L. Rev. 784, 788 (1957). See, e.g., Morton v. Maryland Cas.

Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 123-27, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524, 530-33 (1955); Simpson v.
Foundation Co., 210 N.Y. 479, 95 N.E. 10 (1911).
29. See, e.g., Miami Jockey Club v. Union Assur. Society, 12 F. Supp. 657
(S.D. Fla. 1935), aff'd, 82 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Smith Stage v. Eckert, 21 Ariz.

28, 184 P. 1001 (1919); Rodzborski v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 210 N.Y. 262, 104
N.E. 616 (1914); Cosselman v. Dunfee, 59 App. Div. 467, 69 N.Y.S. 271 (1901),
aff'd, 172 N.Y. 507, 65 N.E. 494 (1902); Conwell v. Hays, 103 W. Va. 69, 136 S.E.
604 (1927). Some states have an express legislative basis for excluding evidence
of insurance. E.g., MicI. STAT. ANN. § 24.13030 (1957) ; N.D. Rev. COD. §§ 39-1611,
49-1833 (Supp. 1957).
30. Comment, Insurance as Evidence, 16 SYRAcUSa L. Rev. 92 (1964). See
Pinkerton v. Oak Park Nat'l Bank, 16 Ill. App. 2d 91, 147 N.E.2d 390 (1958).
31. Note, 41 MINN. L. Rsv. 784, 790 (1957). See Lassiter, Direct Actions . . .
Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411, 416.
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establish issues other than liability. 2 Insurance companies seem to
implicitly admit this lack of prejudice when they reveal their interests
to potential jurors through extra-judicial campaigns designed to influence
the populace to consider the impact that high damage awards have on
premiums. 88 Moreover, studies have indicated that the effect of an unequivocal statement to the jury concerning insurance may tend to lessen
84
unconscionably low damage awards with no prejudice to the insurer.
At least one state which statutorily allows direct action against insurance
companies has found that judgments are not significantly higher than
those entered prior to the statutes. 3 5 Thus, it appears that direct action
against an insurer is not as prejudicial as contended and that the intent
of the legislature, the intent of the parties, and possibly even the
interests of the insurer are best effectuated by allowing the injured third
party to sue the insurance company directly.
Having concluded that an injured plaintiff has a right of direct
action against the insurer, the Shingleton court was then confronted
with the question of whether this right could be deferred by a no action
clause. It decides this issue in the negative, resting its conclusion on
public policy, Florida procedural rules, and its construction of the
Itopen courts" clause of the Florida constitution. 6
The arguments on the public policy grounds are virtually identical
to those used by the court in justifying the use of a third party beneficiary theory to permit direct suit.8 7

Additionally, however, the court

emphasizes that situations arise in which plaintiff's recovery would be
delayed due to disputes between the insured and the insurer - i.e.,
where the insurer seeks a declaratory judgment discharging his liability
on the policy because of lack of proper notice 8 - and that these delays
would tend to undercut the primary public policy of securing recompense
for injured parties. 89 Similarly, it would also appear that by issuing
an insurance contract for the direct benefit of the public, the insurer
32. Comment, supra note 27, at 366-67. See, e.g., General Accident & Fire & Life
Assur. Corp. v. Ramos, 34 Misc. 2d 450, 225 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Levatino
v. Rochester Savings Bank, 38 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Rashall v. Morra,
250 App. Div. 474, 294 N.Y.S. 630 (1937) ; McGovern v. Oliver, 177 App. Div. 167,
163 N.Y.S. 275 (1917).
33. Comment, supra note 30, at 100. See Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d
269, 330 P.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1958) ; Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, 176 Kan. 101,
269 P.2d 435 (1954).
34. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Award, 19 OHIO ST.
L.J. 158, 171-72 (1958).
35. Wisconsin has permitted direct action. See note 12 supra. Verdicts there
compared favorably with those in surrounding states not permitting such action.
See 8 APPL-MAN § 4861, supra note 3, at 294 n.18.
36. 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. CONST., DECLARATION ol RIGHTS § 4 (1968) provides:
Courts to be open; remedies guaranteed. Section 4. All courts in this state
shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and
jutice shall be administered without . . . delay.
(emphasis added.)
37. See pp. 260-61 supra.
38. See, e.g., Bergh v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968).
39. Rhame v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 539, 121 S.E.2d 94 (1961).
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has implicitly consented to suit by injured members thereof. Therefore,
he should not be allowed to give such consent in one breath and deny
it in the next.40 Consequently, the court's public policy rationale for
direct suit would seem to mandate a conclusion that the no action clause
is unenforceable.
The court's further argument that allowing direct action by the
injured party in spite of the contractual no action clause serves to implement Florida's procedural rules can be supported by reference to the
applicable rules. The joinder rule permits plaintiff to join as a de41
In the instant case there
fendant anyone possessing adverse interests.
can be no doubt that the insurer's interests were adverse to plaintiff's,
and therefore, on its face, the rule would appear to demand direct action.
Moreover, since application of this rule must be in compliance with the
mandate to construe the rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action . .. ,"42 it is obvious that allowing the no
action clause to defer suit would be antagonistic to this mandate in light
43
of the delay and costs involved in liability insurance suits.

Hence, the

criteria of the civil rules would appear to be best met when direct suit
is allowed.
Additional support for the above conclusion may be found in the fact
that dual suits should be avoided if a single suit will assure a fair trial for
all parties.4 4 But where an insurance company is involved, it can be argued
that a single suit will not grant the insurer a fair trial because he may be
forced to take contradictory positions where questions as to his liability
under the contract arise, i.e., requiring him to assert policy defenses
45
against the insured while fulfilling his duty to defend for him. Although
the court in the instant case sought to overcome this argument by providing for severance where such questions would cloud the issues re46
garding insured's liability to plaintiff, situations may arise where the
defense on the insurance contract is not apparent to the insurer at the
outset of trial, i.e., where the defense is based on insured's failure to
47
fulfill his obligation to cooperate with the insurer during litigation.
40. This is the rationale used in the states with direct action statutes. See, e.g.,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Buxton v. Midwestern
Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 500 (D.C. La. 1952) ; Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 433,
138 A. 186 (1927) ; Lang v. Baumann, 213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 461 (1934).
41. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1-210(a) (1968).
42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010 (1968); See Arnow & Brown, Florida's 1954 Rules
of Civil Procedure,7 U. FLA. L. Rv. 125 (1954); Wiggenton, New Florida Common
Law Rules, 3 U. FLA. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
43. See, e.g., Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 185 So. 2d 689
(Fla. 1966).
44. See, e.g., United Tile Co. v. Marks Const. Co., 215 So. 2d 147 (La. 1968);
Olivedell Planting Co., Inc. v. Town of Lake Providence, 209 La. 898, 25 So. 2d 735
(1946); Barton v. Farmer's State Bank, 276 S.W. 177 (Tex. 1925); American
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Struwe, 218 S.W. 534 (Tex. 1920) ; National Bank of Jefferson v.Texas Investment Co., 74 Tex. 421, 12 S.W. 101 (1899).
45. See, e.g., Bergstein v. Popkin, 202 Wis. 625, 233 N.W. 572, 574 (1930).
46. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 720 (Fla. 1969).
47. C.C.H. Auto. L. Rep. f 2360, at 2035.
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However, there appears to be nothing to stop severance once the insurer
discovers that this defense may be available to him. 48 And even if this
problem could not be resolved, the fairness of the trial would appear
to be even more questionable if direct action were not allowed, since the
deferment of the injured person's recovery because of provisions in a contract to which he was not a party would create a much greater injustice. 49
Although Florida's public policy and procedural rules would seem
to provide sufficient reason for not giving effect to no action clauses,
the court finds further justification for its decision under the due process
clause of the state constitution, which requires that right and justice be
administered without delay. 50 Many situations arise where delay will
occur if full effect is given to the no action clause. Requiring two
suits forces plaintiff to wait until the conclusion of the second action for
payment. Likewise, the insurer is required to await the conclusion of
the suit between the injured party and the insured before asserting
insurance contract defenses. His right to justice without delay would
also appear to be violated for a similar period. Thus, allowing the no
action clause to defer suit against the insurer and thereby requiring two
suits would appear to be repugnant to this constitutional mandate.
Although the foregoing argument appears persuasive on its face,
it is against the weight of authority. There are thirty-five states which
have constitutional declarations similar to the one in question. Thirtyone of these permit no action clauses to defer direct suit against insurer,"'
and the other four have direct action statutes 52 on which they base
their decision. Thus, the Florida court has propounded a rationale
which even direct action states have been loath to expound, and it appears
that Shingleton would probably have been a less controversial decision
had the court relied exclusively on the valid public and procedural
policy arguments.
Having taken the position that no action clauses violate the due
process clause, the court has left itself open to constitutional arguments
48. This requires insurer to be alert for this defense so that it does not go undiscovered until after trial. But even if it should go undiscovered and, therefore, be
subsequently unavailable, the apparent injustice to plaintiff resulting from delayed
recovery seems to require that insurer take other measures to protect its interests.
See p. 265 infra.

49. In construing the state's direct action statutes, Louisiana courts have held
that clauses making notice to the insurer a condition precedent to his liability are
inapplicable to injured third parties, and that third parties' rights should not be
defeasible by insured's violation of the policy. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189,
46 So. 2d 122 -(1950) ; Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. App. 1934) ;
Edwards v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 11 La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929). Also, it has
been noted that an injured party could not be required to comply with a provision
that assured render co-operation and assistance to the insurer in conducting legal
proceedings. Id. at 801.
50. 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 4 (1968).

51. See, e.g., Schachtrup v. Union Auto. Indem. Ass'n, 303 Il. App. 445, 25
N.E.2d 534 (1940) ; Haines v. Harrison, 357 Mo. 956, 211 S.W.2d 489 (1948)
Johnson v. McGilchrist, 174 Wash. 178, 24 P.2d 607 (1933).
52. Arkansas, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See note 12 supra.
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regarding obligations of contracts. It can be argued that the allowance
of direct action suits against the insurer in the face of a no action clause
impairs the obligations of contract in violation of federal and state
constitutional rights. 53 The contention would be that such clauses secure
valuable rights for the insurance company 54 and that a balance struck
in favor of direct action is unreasonable because it infringes upon those
rights. However, when weighed against the state's interest in its established public policy of providing remedy and recompense for injured
persons, such rights would not seem to dictate against direct action.
It is on such a balance that direct action statutes have been held
constitutional as not imposing a substantial impairment of contract. 55
Furthermore, the only apparent contract right or interest secured by such
a clause is that of not having the fact of insurance introduced into the
case, and as has already been noted, the preservation of such an interest
is not substantial reason to deny an injured third party the ordinary
rights of litigants.5 6
Thus, although it appears that the court's reliance on the state's due
process clause is against the weight of authority, other justifications for
direct suit would seem to support the instant decision. Moreover, it is
difficult to see how allowing direct action places an unusual burden on
the insurer, since he has the ability to predict the risks to be encountered
and the freedom to raise the selling price of his product should his
operating costs increase. 57 Consequently, should this case be followed
by states having public policies similar to those enunciated in the instant
case it should result in a more just and speedy determination of automobile
accident cases insuring financial security for injured third parties without
judicial or economic prejudice to insurance companies.
Thomas R.

Hendershot

53. See, e.g., Bish v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.
La. 1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1953), rev'd on rehearing per
curiam, 217 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Comment, supra note 9, at 507.

54. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Bank of Minden v. Clement,

256 U.S. 126 (1921); Pawlowski v. Eskofski, 209 Wis. 189, 244 N.W. 611 (1932).

55. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Michael v.

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Ark. 1950) ; Talbot v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 76 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1954). Also, it has been held that giving such statutes
retroactive effect would not impair any of insurer's substantial rights. Rossville
Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Dennis Sheen Transfer Co., 18 La. App. 725, 138 So.
183 (1931).
56. See p. 261 supra.
57. Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797, 802 (La. App. 1934) (dictum).
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NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS FINAL PAYMENT PAYOR
BANK'S ACCEPTANCE OF CHECK FROM PAYEE DEPOSITOR PARTLY
FOR CASH AND BALANCE FOR CREDIT CONSTITUTES FINAL PAYMENT.
Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank (Va. 1969)

Defendant payee' presented a check for $2,500 to plaintiff depositary2-payor bank 8 and received $200 of the check in cash with the
$2,300 balance credited to her account. Upon subsequent dishonor of
the check for insufficient funds, the bank charged back 4 to defendant's
account and commenced suit for the overdraft 5 created by the charge.
The trial court granted judgment for the bank, but the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the bank had cashed the
check upon presentment, thus constituting final payment under the Uniform Commercial Code and preventing any right of charge back. Kirby
v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, ___ Va.-...., 168 S.E2d 273 (1969).
The concept of final payment under Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code is extremely important since it is the starting point for
determining the rights and obligations of numerous parties in relation to
an item 6 - including the determination of when a payor bank becomes
liable for the amount of the item.7 Prior to adoption of the Code, the
traditional rule for "on us" items 8 was that final payment occurred
either when the bank gave cash to the holder or credited his account.9
As check volume increased, however, there became a need to balance
the bank's desire for time to process the check with the payee's need
1. The "payee" of a check is the individual who is intended by the drawer of
the check to be the recipient of the money. Schweitzer v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Savings Ass'n, 42 Cal. App. 2d 536, 542, 109 P.2d 441, 445 (1941).
2. UNIIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-105(a) defines "depositary bank" as "the
first bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also the
payor bank."
3. "Payor bank" 's defined in UNnPORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-105(b) as "a
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted." In the instant case, the
payor bank also happened to be the depositary bank.
4. "Charge-back," although not defined in the Code, is a debit to a depositor's
account that offsets a previous credit that was not collected. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 377 (P. Gove ed. 1965).
5. Subsequent to the deposit and prior to suit, the defendant made withdrawals
from his account, lowering the balance below $2,500.
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(1) (g) defines "item" as "any instrument
for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not include money."
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(1). Other examples of the importance
of "final payment" are: the drawer of the instrument is relieved of liability to the
holder upon final payment; the owner of an item will have a preferred claim against
the payor bank for the amount of an item once final payment has occurred; and final
payment is one of the occurrences which can prevent notice, stop-order, legal process,
and set-off (the "four legals") from being effective to prevent actual payment of
the item.
8. Items presented directly to the payor bank either for deposit or for cash.
9. University
1 PATON'SCharles
DIGESTWidger
1066-68
(1940).
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for speed in payment. 10 The draftsmen of the Code achieved this
balance by adopting the principle of "settle now, investigate later.""
This means that when a check is presented to a payor bank for deposit,
provisional credit is given' 2 and the bank is afforded additional time
in which to process the check and charge back'" its customer's account
if the check is subsequently dishonored. However, the bank's right of
charge back must be exercised prior to its "midnight deadline"' 4 and
before it has made final payment. 15 Most of the post-Code litigation
10. Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Under The Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. PiTT. L. Rlv. 565, 571 (1954). For a good analysis of the development and drafting of Article 4 of the Code see Malcolm, Article 4 - A Battle With
Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265.
11. Leary, Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code,
49 MARQ. L. Rzv. 331, 335 (1965). Mr. Leary was formerly the Reporter for Article 4
of the Code; however, he did not prepare the final draft.
12. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-201(l) states:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and prior to the time that a settlement
given by a collecting bank for an item is or becomes final (subsection (3) of
section 4-211 and sections 4-212 and 4-213) the bank is an agent or sub-agent
of the owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional.
To "settle," according to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-104(j) is:
[T]o pay in cash, by clearing house settlement, in a charge or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be either provisional or final.
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-212(3) provides:
A depositary bank which is also the payor bank may charge back the amount of
an item to its customer's account or obtain refund in accordance with the section
governing return of an item received by a payor bank for credit on its books
(section 4-301).
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COD § 4-301 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Where an authorized settlement for a demand item (other than a documentary
draft) received by a payor bank otherwise than for immediate payment over the
counter has been made before midnight of the banking day of receipt the payor
bank may revoke the settlement and recover any payment if before it has made
final payment (subsection (1) of section 4-213) and before its midnight deadline it
(a) returns the item; or
(b) sends written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if the item is held for protest or is otherwise unavailable for return.
(2) If a demand itcm is received by a payor bank for credit on its books it may
return such item or send notice of dishonor and may revoke any credit given or
recover the amount thereof withdrawn by its customer, if it acts within the time
limit and in the manmer specified in the preceding subsection.
Comment 2 to § 4-301 indicates that "[tihe time limits for action imposed by subsection (1) are adopted by subsection (2) for cases where the payor bank is also the
depositary bank, but in this case the requirement of a settlement on the day of receipt
is omitted." Section 4-104(1) (h) of the Code defines "midnight deadline" with respect
to a bank as "midnight on its next banking day following the banking day on which
it receives the relevant item or notice or from which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later."
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-213(1), in defining the time of final payment, states:
An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the
following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and
without having such right under statute, clearing housing rule or agreement; or
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule
or agreement.
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c), or (d), the payor bank
shall be accountable for the amount of the item.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/11
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17
with respect to final payment'8 has involved the process of posting,
which is only one of several determinants of final payment.' 8 There
has been little, if any, litigation as to when a bank has "paid the item in
cash," another determinant of final payment under the Code.
The issue facing the Virginia court of appeals in Kirby was
whether or not the bank had made final payment and was thus precluded from exercising its right of charge back. The bank contended
that the credit given to the payee was provisional pending final settlement.
In addition, it argued that the payee should be liable as an endorser
under section 3-414(1), 19 and that even if the check was paid in cash, the
20
settlement was provisional under the terms of the deposit contract.
With respect to the bank's first argument, i.e., that only provisional
paper credit had been given, the court held that the bank had "paid the item
in cash" within the meaning of section 4-213(1)(a). 21 It based this
decision on the fact that the bank paid $200 of the check in cash; that
the bank vice president testified that they "cashed the check"; that
the "$2,300" was written opposite "currency" on the deposit slip; that
the words "cash for Dep." were written on the back of the check; and
that the bank's ledger indicated a credit of $2,300 to the payee's account
rather than a credit of $2,500 and a debit of $200. The court further
held that an endorser contracts to pay an instrument only if it is dishonored and since the bank had in fact "paid the item in cash" and had

16. Gibbs v. Gerberich, 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964) ; West Side
Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
17. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-109 states:
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by a payor bank
in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment including one or more
of the following or other steps as determined by the bank:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

verification of any signature;
ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to
the item.
For a general discussion of the process of posting see 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rzv.

957 (1968).
18. See note 15 supra.
19. UNIFORM COMM8RCIAL CODE § 3414(1) states:
Unless the endorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words as "without recourse") every endorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice
of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the
time of his endorsement to the holder or to any subsequent endorser who takes it
up, even though the endorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
20. The depositor's contract provided in pertinent part:
Items received for deposit or collection are accepted on the following terms and
conditions. This bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent and assumes no
responsibility beyond its exercise of due care. All items are credited subject to
final payment and to receipt of proceeds of final payment in cash or solvent credits
by this bank at its own office. . . This bank may charge back, at any time prior
to midnight on its business day next following the day of receipt, any item drawn
on this bank which is ascertained to be drawn against insufficient funds or otherwise not good or payable.
210 Va. 88, -...,168 S.E.2d 273, 277 n.6 (1969).
Published by Villanova
Charles
WidgeratSchool
21. University
Id. at ....
, 168 S.E.2d
276. of Law Digital Repository, 1969

55

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 11
FALL

1969]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

not dishonored it, the payee could not be liable as an endorser under
section 3-414(1) of the Code.2 2 With respect to the deposit contract
issue, the court found that it in no way changed the requirements of the
Code2 since the contract clearly recognized that settlement for an item
is provisional only until the item is finally paid. The court also stated
that even if the bank's settlement had been provisional, it lost its right
of charge back,2 4 since it neither returned the item nor sent written
notice prior to its midnight deadline, in accordance with section 4-301.25
The dissent, on the other hand, felt that the settlement in question
was provisional 26 and that the bank should have had the right of charge
back since it gave oral notice of dishonor to its customer and justifiably
27
relied on the customer's promise to come in and cover the check.
Classifying this as a normal and customary banking transaction, the
dissent explained that the same bank official that testified for the majority
also testified that the bank "received it [the check] for deposit," and
the fact that the deposit was made against a check was clearly evidenced
on the face of the deposit slip. Thus, the dissent concluded that there
was nothing in the record to support the proposition that the plaintiff
28
had cashed the check.
The Code does not define the meaning of the words "paid the
item in cash," but comment 3 to section 4-213 indicates that the Code
was designed to continue the traditional rule of payment in cash. As
explanation for this concept, comment 3 cites the reader to Paton's
Digest where the following rule is stated: "A check presented over the
counter by the holder is paid when money or its equivalent is given to
the holder."'29 "Or its equivalent" is later defined as a bank draft 0 or
credit to a customer's passbook. 3 1 However, since it was the express
purpose of the authors of the Code to alter only the rule regarding
passbook credit as final payment,3 2 comment 3 seems to indicate that
the Code is designed to continue the rule that payment in cash or payment
by bank draft is final payment. Under this view, the defendant in
Kirby would have had to receive the full $2,500 in cash or a bank draft
22. Id. at _,

168 S.E.2d at 276. The court went on to say that if the bank

dishonored the check after it made final payment, it could only sue defendants for
breach of warranty and since the customer's warranties as set forth in sections
3-417(1) and 4-207(1) do not include a warranty that the drawer of the check has
sufficient funds, the bank would have no cause of action.
23. Id. at
_, 168 S.E.2d at 277.
24. Id. at .
168 S.E.2d at 277.
25. See note 14 supra.
26. Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 218 Va. 88,
,168 S.E.2d 273,
278 (1969).
27. Id. at
, 168 S.E.2d at 279.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at
, 168 S.E.2d at 278.
1 PATON'S DIGST 1066 (1940) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1067.
32. Leary, supra note 11, at 334-35.
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before the item could be said to have been "paid in cash."3 3 The
defendant, however, never alleged that she received the full amount
in her hands, but the court held that certain documentary evidence coupled
with partial payment was sufficient to establish that the bank cashed the
check and made final payment. This appears to be a misreading of
both the intent and purpose of the Code.
By finding that certain documentary evidence coupled with a partial
payment in cash is sufficient to establish that a payor bank has "paid
the item in cash," the Kirby court has held that a bank can pay a check
in cash without ever delivering the full amount of currency to the payee.
The ramifications of this decision for Virginia depositors and banks
are significant. A payee-depositor may avoid the bank's right of charge
back under either the Uniform Commercial Code or the depositor
agreement by demanding part payment in cash and by entering the
amount of the check opposite the "currency" section of the deposit slip.
The banks, on the other hand, to avoid the consequences of final payment
would have to caution their tellers to be overly scrupulous in examining
deposit slips for proper entries prior to part payment of a check. In
addition, the banks would be forced to make three entries in their
ledger (e.g., the amount of the check, the amount given in cash, and
the amount credited to the account) and refrain from stamping "cash
for deposit" on the back of the check.
In light of the decision in the instant case, it appears that the best
way for a bank to handle a part cash-part credit transaction upon
presentment of a check is to have the customer deposit the check in
his account and then immediately either write a check against the deposit
or make a withdrawal. This immediate withdrawal would not destroy
the bank's agency status3 4 but it would inconvenience the customer by
making him fill out one more piece of paper and pay the additional
charge for processing the check. Although such a procedure might
initially cause some displeasure among depositors, it would have the
overall effect of permitting the customer to draw against the deposited
check while still retaining the bank's right of charge back.
However, even if the Kirby court had not found that final payment
had occurred, it still could have held the bank accountable for the item
since the bank did not give notice of dishonor within the time limits prescribed.3 5 Section 4-301 clearly indicates that a payor may revoke its
36
settlement and recover any payment if before the "midnight deadline" it
33. Also, it should be noted that the phrase is "paid the item in cash," not paid

part of the item in cash and credited the balance to depositor's account.
34. UNIPORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-201(1), after describing the bank's
status, states: "This provision applies . . . even though credit given for the
subject to immediate withdrawal as of right or is in fact withdrawn . .. ."
35. The court could also have reasoned that the bank's actions evidenced
trary intent" within the meaning of section 4-201 except for the fact that
positor's agreement deleted this phrase from its text.
36. See note 14 supra.
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either "returns the item" or "sends written notice of dishonor." In the
Kirby case it is undeniable that the bank failed to give notice of dishonor
prior to its midnight deadline 7 and thus pursuant to section 4-3023s
the bank should be held accountable for the item.
In dicta, the Kirby court did in fact state that since the bank gave
oral but not written notice of dishonor it failed to meet its obligation
under section 4-301. However, a payor bank may be able to give oral
notice of dishonor prior to its midnight deadline and fulfill its obligation
under section 4-301. Although subsection 1 of section 4-301 states that
in order to exercise its right of charge back a payor bank must send
written notice of dishonor, subsection 3 states that:
Unless previous notice of dishonor has been sent an item is dishonored at the time when for purposes of dishonor it is returned
or notice sent in accordance with this section.8 9
In Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita,40 the court indicated that the first phrase of subsection 3 is a reference to section 3-508,
which states that notice of dishonor may be given in any reasonable manner,
whether it be oral or written. 41 Although due to the peculiarities of the
4
case 42 the court was ultimately able to base its decision on section 3-51 1,
its position with respect to oral notice is further supported by comment 3
to section 4-301, which, in discussing the time of notice requirement of
subsection 3, also makes specific reference to section 3-508. Therefore, in
the interest of permitting "the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties" 44 it is submitted that
the position taken by the Leaderbrand court appears to be the more valid
point of view and, consequently, oral notice of dishonor should be effective
45
within the provisions of section 4-301.
37. The bank received the check on December 30, 1966, but did not advise payees
of dishonor until January 5, 1967.
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-302 states:

In the absence of a valid defense . . .if an item is presented on and received by
a payor bank the bank is accountable for the amount of (a) a demand item (where
the bank) does not pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor until after
its midnight deadline.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-301(3) (emphasis added).

40. 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1 (1969).
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-508(3) reads in pertinent part: "Notice may
be given in any reasonable manner. It may be oral or written and in any terms which
identify the instrument and state that it has been dishonored."
42. In Leaderbrand the payee personally presented a check to the payor bank for
payment and on two separate occasions was orally informed that the drawer's account
lacked sufficient funds. The payee then deposited the check in a collecting bank and
when the payor bank failed to respond prior to its midnight deadline, sued the payor
bank for the amount of the check. It is apparent from these facts that the case is
squarely within UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-511. See note 43 infra.
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-511(4) provides: "Where a draft has been
dishonored by nonacceptance a later presentment for payment and any notice of dishonor and protest for nonpayment are excused unless in the meantime the instrument
has been accepted."
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (b).
45. There is also the contra argument that in requiring written notice the problems of mistake and ambiguity associated with oral notice might be alleviated.
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Another issue raised, but left unresolved, by the majority opinion in
Kirby is whether or not provisions of the Code can be varied by agreement. Subsection 1 of section 4-103 states that the effect of the provisions
of Article 4 may be varied by agreement, except that no agreement can
disclaim a bank's responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. While "good
faith" is defined in subsection 19 of section 1-201 as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned," comment 4 to section 4-103 indicates that nowhere is the term "ordinary care" defined and that it is
used in its normal tort meaning and not in any special sense relating
4
to bank collections.
Section 4-202, in discussing the time for taking action by a collecting
47
bank, indicates in subsection 2 that a collecting bank acts "seasonably"
if it acts by its "midnight deadline" following receipt of the item. Subsection 2 also provides that "taking proper action within a reasonably longer
time may be seasonable but the bank has the burden of so establishing."
Thus, it would seem clear from section 4-202 that a collecting bank may,
by agreement with its customer, extend its time for taking action, subject
to the burden of establishing the agreement 48 and the fact that it is seasonable. However, part 3 of Article 4, in defining the duties of a payor
bank, does not mention the term "ordinary care." It speaks merely of the
bank's midnight deadline. Whether or not a payor bank can vary the time
in which it must act, the practical difficulties in making the agreement
binding on third parties seems to be an insurmountable barrier. 49 Nonetheless, subsection 2 of section 4-103 does provide that "Federal Reserve
regulations and operating letters, clearing house rules, and the like" are
effective as agreements even if specific assent is not obtained. Therefore,
in this regard the conclusion seems to be that time limits applicable to a
payor bank may be varied by appropriate Federal Reserve regulations,
operating letters or clearing house rules, but not by the payor bank individually contracting with its own customer. 50
In conclusion, it appears from an examination of the traditional rule
of payment in cash that the Kirby court erred by holding that part payment plus certain documentary evidence is sufficient to establish that a
payor bank has "paid the item in cash." A better approach would have
46. This has led one authority to believe that a bank many contract out of duties
of diligence and reasonableness to the extent that such duties are not comprehended
in the concept of "ordinary care." Leary, supra note 11, at 342.
47. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-204(3) states that "lain action is taken
'seasonably' when it is taken at or within the time agreed or if no time is agreed at
or within a reasonable time."
48. The bank would have to prove that the customer's assent to the proposed
collection method had been secured.
49. Leary, supra note 11, at 344.
50. One authority does not believe the banks and their customers will avail themselves of the privileges of subsection 4-103(1) to any great extent since the rules of
Article 4 are so reasonably fair and workable that banks and depositors will be delighted to have them and will have little reason or desire to vary them by contract.
Malcolm, supra note 10, at 278.
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been to hold that the bank gave defendant provisional credit but that it
failed to revoke the credit within the time limits specified and thus became
accountable for the item. If this case is followed in other jurisdictions the
overall affect would be to slow down banking transactions, increase the
cost of doing business, and abolish a convenient banking technique relied
upon by depositors. With the ever increasing number of checks in use,
it is submitted that these results are undesirable to both the banking
industry and the public.

Gordon B. Aydelott
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